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INTRODUCTION 
On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 530D,1 sent a letter to Speaker of the House John A. Boehner 
to advise Congress that President Obama had instructed the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) to cease defending Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act 
 
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (“The Attorney General shall submit to the Con-
gress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of 
Justice . . . establishes or implements a formal or informal policy to refrain . . . from enforcing, 
applying, or administering any provision of any Federal statute . . . on the grounds that such 
provision is unconstitutional . . . .”). 
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(DOMA) in litigation challenging its constitutionality.2 According to the 
letter, the federal definition of “marriage” as the “legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife”3 “violates the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment” by discriminating on the basis of 
sexual orientation.4 Attorney General Holder asserted that classifications 
based on sexual orientation—the standard for which has not yet been set by 
the Supreme Court—should receive heightened scrutiny, not rational basis 
review, as some courts have already held.5 Noting the rarity of such a 
nondefense decision, Holder explained that the executive branch would 
continue to enforce DOMA until congressional repeal or “the judicial branch 
renders a definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality.”6 
In a press release, Speaker Boehner declared that “[t]he constitutionality 
of this law should be determined by the courts—not by the President 
unilaterally.”7 The Speaker’s retort ignored the Attorney General’s explana-
tion that “[e]xecutive agencies [would] continue to comply with Section 3 of 
DOMA,” because “[t]his course of action respects the actions of the prior 
Congress that enacted DOMA, and it recognizes the judiciary as the final 
arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.”8 
In this Comment, I assess and suggest modifications for the framework 
under which Presidents decide not to defend statutes they view as unconsti-
tutional under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.9 I 
argue that nondefense decisions based on equal protection principles should 
 
2 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on 
Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Holder Letter], 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
3 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); see also id. (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of 
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the 
United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife.”). 
4 Holder Letter, supra note 2. 
5 See id. (citing cases). 
6 Id. 
7 Press Release, Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Statement 
by House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) Regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (Mar. 4, 2011), 
available at http://www.speaker.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=227372. 
8 See Holder Letter, supra note 2. 
9 Throughout this Comment, my references to equal protection refer to the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment first recognized in Bolling v. Sharpe. See 347 U.S. 497, 500 
(1954) (holding that where states were prohibited from certain actions under the Equal Protection 
Clause, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the 
Federal Government”); see also, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995) 
(explaining that “the equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments [are] indistinguishable” and citing cases standing for this principle).  
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be treated differently than those based on other considerations.10 Specifically, 
when the President believes that the courts should apply heightened 
scrutiny where they currently do not, he has a duty not only to decline to 
defend the statute, but also to instruct the DOJ to argue this position before 
the courts. The modified framework that I ultimately offer for nondefense 
decisions incorporates considerations that target equal protection cases.  
Throughout my argument, I seek to contribute to the nondefense dialogue 
by addressing two issues in particular. First, scholars and members of 
Congress have expressed concerns that President Obama’s decision not to 
defend DOMA sets us on a slippery slope to further Executive power grabs. 
But my focus on equal protection, and later careful analysis of President 
Obama’s decision, proves that these concerns are unfounded. The additional 
authority for deciding not to defend a statute like DOMA finds support in 
countermajoritarian principles and the balance of harm to individuals 
weighed against the value of respecting the separation of powers. The 
modifications I offer to Walter Dellinger’s nonenforcement decisionmaking 
framework11 adapt it from facilitating presidential nonenforcement decisions 
to informing presidential nondefense decisions; these modifications also 
help to cabin presidential nondefense decisions to equal protection viola-
tions or similarly weighty concerns by forcing the President to ask a series 
of questions, the answers to which should be provided to the courts and the 
public. Under—or at least influenced by—this framework, for instance, a 
President who disagreed with Congress about the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause would have little room to 
refuse to defend it.12 The framework I suggest is grounded in reasons why 
 
10 There is a robust literature on presidential nonenforcement and nondefense of arguably 
unconstitutional statutes, but scholars and government attorneys have not addressed whether 
perceived unconstitutionality based on equal protection principles—as opposed to some other 
constitutional value—should change the terms of the decision. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna 
Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 526 (2012) (“There is no 
principled, textual basis for why the OLC [the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel] exalts the 
Executive’s pet peeve, infringements on Executive power, above violations of freedom of speech 
or federalism.”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1198-
205 (2012) (arguing that the nondefense decision can be characterized as based on the level of 
doubt about the constitutionality of the provision or upon separation-of-powers principles, 
without addressing whether the underlying constitutional value matters). 
11 For a discussion of Dellinger’s framework, see infra Section I.B. 
12 My point is not that the President and DOJ can or cannot refuse to defend statutes in 
contexts beyond equal protection. Rather, such decisions will be less likely after additional 
considerations are weighed. It is likewise important to point out that the President’s choice is not 
a policy or a political choice. Policy may motivate a certain view or inquiry, but at most, policy 
helps bring to light a legal conclusion. Dellinger’s framework and my modifications make explicit 
that policy disagreement with a duly enacted statute, without more, is not a valid ground for 
nondefense. 
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equal protection nondefense decisions deserve greater solicitude, and adds 
to Dellinger’s considerations the important idea that the President’s 
nondefense might actually influence the Supreme Court in its ultimate 
judgment—not constitute that judgment itself. The model accounts for 
important separation-of-powers principles by recognizing both the primacy 
of judicial review, but also the influence of the Executive in going beyond 
mere prediction and instead helping guide the path of the case law. 
Second, nondefense decisions should not be considered the same as 
nonenforcement decisions, regardless of whether scholars think that equal 
treatment of the two decisions is justified as a matter of theory or principle.13 
In this Comment, I offer some observations on the existence of the distinc-
tion and why it matters: it can both influence the President’s initial decision 
and also be leveraged by the President and DOJ in important ways. 
Splitting the difference by deciding to enforce a law while refusing to 
defend it can help to balance important equal protection values with 
significant separation-of-powers concerns. As the ongoing DOMA litigation 
demonstrates, such a course of action might actually increase interbranch 
dialogue. 
I begin in Part I with the necessary background for addressing any non-
enforcement or nondefense decisions. I first consider the constitutional 
authority for nonenforcement and nondefense and observe that it is fairly 
settled that the President can refuse to defend a law that he views as 
unconstitutional, and recognized, even if over vigorous dissent, that he 
might choose not to enforce it. The issue then becomes how the President 
should make such a nondefense decision. I posit that Walter Dellinger’s 
framework for deciding when the President can refuse to enforce a law, 
along with the relevant modifications that Dawn Johnsen has suggested 
(which together I call the “Dellinger/Johnsen framework”), serves as a 
useful starting point for answering this question. 
In Part II, I address some of the relevant distinctions between non-
enforcement and nondefense, and by examining and elaborating on the 
Dellinger and Johnsen frameworks, I show that they apply equally well, if 
not better, to nondefense decisions. I am concerned in particular with the 
observations that nondefense, more so than nonenforcement, respects the 
separation of powers, facilitates judicial review, and considers changed 
circumstances. 
Then, in Part III, I observe that, while the President’s authority not to 
defend a statute may vary, the equal protection context is a uniquely 
 
13 See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 522 (arguing that Presidents should neither 
enforce nor defend laws they deem unconstitutional); see also infra note 71. 
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significant arena for presidential nondefense decisions. While Neal Devins 
and Saikrishna Prakash have argued that Article I of the Constitution does 
not support treating various constitutional values any differently for 
purposes of nondefense,14 there are in fact significant reasons for viewing 
equal protection as deserving special treatment. I contend that where the 
President believes that courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, should 
apply heightened scrutiny but nonetheless fears that the Court will instead 
underenforce the Constitution by applying rational basis review, he has an 
enhanced responsibility to alert the Court by not defending the objectiona-
ble statute. In this endeavor, I incorporate the underenforcement theories of 
scholars such as Larry Sager, as well as offer numerous examples of the 
Executive’s historical influence on the Court. Finally, I present a modified 
model that incorporates these relevant factors bearing on equal protection 
analysis into the nondefense inquiry. 
Part IV serves as a real-life example. I apply this modified model to 
President Obama’s decision not to defend DOMA to illustrate how his 
decisionmaking process correctly addressed all of the prongs of this discre-
tionary framework and, in the process, has respected the separation of 
powers by continuing to enable—and indeed soliciting—judicial resolution 
of DOMA’s constitutionality. 
I. THE DELLINGER/JOHNSEN FRAMEWORK  
AND THE NONDEFENSE CONTEXT 
President Obama was not the first to consider not defending a statute. 
In fact, he could have looked to a body of historical and scholarly thought 
on presidential decisions not to enforce arguably unconstitutional statutes. 
In 1994, Walter Dellinger, then serving as Assistant Attorney General for 
the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, addressed presidential nonenforcement of 
constitutionally objectionable statutes in his memorandum, Presidential 
Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes.15 The guidance 
therein serves as a workable framework for a President approaching the 
politically and legally challenging scenario of deciding whether, or how, to 
execute a law he sees as constitutionally infirm. Because Dellinger himself 
was not thinking or writing in a vacuum,16 I begin by briefly describing the 
robust tradition of Executive nonenforcement behind the memorandum. I 
 
14 Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 526. 
15 Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
199, 199-203 (1994) [hereinafter Dellinger Memorandum]. 
16 See Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 518 (noting that “Walter Dellinger’s 1994 opinion 
added several wrinkles” to preexisting thought on the issue). 
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then discuss Dellinger’s framework. This tradition and Dellinger’s frame-
work provide important background considerations for the argument for 
why we should view the authority for presidential nondefense decisions as 
heightened when the statute is allegedly unconstitutional under the Fifth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.  
A. Can the President Decline to Enforce or Defend a Statute? 
The threshold question a President must consider when confronted with 
a statute he views as violating equal protection is whether, given the 
Constitution’s command in what is known as the Take Care Clause that he 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”17 he can refuse to enforce 
or defend the statute at all. The answer is a qualified “yes,” as the brief 
survey below of Supreme Court dicta, James Wilson’s reasoning, presiden-
tial practice, and congressional acquiescence demonstrates. 
While the Constitution does not expressly state that the President can 
decline to enforce or defend a constitutionally objectionable statute,18 
neither does it state that the Supreme Court has the power of judicial 
review. This observation underlies a legal theory known as “departmental-
ism,” which contends that the Executive, as a coordinate branch of govern-
ment, has the authority to independently interpret the Constitution and act 
accordingly.19 Armed with this authority, several Presidents have declined 
 
17 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. 
18 See Joel K. Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Explorations, 43 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791, 829 (1999) (explaining that while other officials take an oath to support the 
Constitution, the President “is its guarantor . . . he has special responsibilities to make certain that 
the Constitution survives his watch”). 
19 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What 
the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 301 (1994) (asserting that “separation of powers does not mean equality 
of powers” and that it is the Executive’s, as well as the Judiciary’s, responsibility to assess the 
constitutionality of laws); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A 
Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 352 (1994) (arguing for a version of departmentalism 
taking into account “comparative institutional competence”); Dawn Johnsen, Functional 
Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 108 (2004) (advocating “functional departmentalism,” a “variation 
informed by past practice and the practical implications for our system of constitutional self-
government”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1032-33 (2004) (“Most theorists of departmentalism situate 
their analysis in the context of separation of powers . . . [and] . . . ask[] how the constitutionally 
assigned functions and distinctive interpretive capacities of the three branches of the federal 
government should be coordinated.”); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 120 (1993) (positing that the executive branch should take into 
account its own—and different—institutional concerns when interpreting the Constitution). 
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to execute statutes they have found unconstitutional.20 Whether the 
President is considering nonenforcement or nondefense, as a matter of 
constitutional design, he will be both checked and guided by political 
accountability rather than judicial authority21—at least as long as he makes 
public his nondefense decisions and the bases for them. 
Some Supreme Court dicta—at least as Dellinger broadly read them—
approve of nonenforcement in at least some circumstances.22 Dellinger also 
marshaled the Framers’ intent as support23: James Wilson, a delegate at the 
Constitutional Convention and later a Supreme Court Justice, reasoned that 
if the legislature “transgress[ed] the bounds assigned to it,” not only would 
judges have the “duty to pronounce [the offending act] void,” but so too 
could the President “shield himself, and refuse to carry into effect an act 
 
20 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 18, at 809 (“Thomas Jefferson ordered government attor-
neys not to prosecute persons under the Sedition Act. Andrew Johnson violated the Tenure of 
Office Act on Constitution basis. When Woodrow Wilson ignored a statute that conditioned 
removal of postmasters on Senate approval, the Court held the measure unconstitutional. No 
[J]ustice even suggested Wilson had acted improperly in refusing to enforce a statute he thought 
unconstitutional.”); see also Letter from Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, Supreme Court of the 
United States, to Gerrit Smith (Apr. 19, 1868), in JACOB WILLIAM SCHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND 
PUBLIC SERVICES OF SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 577 (1874) (“[A]cts of Congress not warranted 
by the Constitution are not laws. . . . [W]here [a statute] directly attacks and impairs the 
Executive power confided to [the President] by the Constitution . . . the clear duty of the 
President [is] to disregard the law, so far at least as it may be necessary in order to bring the 
question of its constitutionality before the judicial tribunals.”). 
21 See Neomi Rao, The President’s Sphere of Action, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 527, 536 (2009) 
(“If the President refuses to enforce a statute on constitutional grounds, there is little that 
Congress can do . . . [outside of] impeachment.”). Instead, the checks on the President are 
political in nature. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: 
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 61 (2010) (discussing checks on the President and 
contending that “these checks are not primarily legal. . . . Rather legislators appeal to the court of 
public opinion, which in turn constrains the President”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 113 (1999) (“[T]he President’s political incentives lead 
him or her to act in a way consistent with constitutional values.” (emphasis added)); Peter L. 
Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116 (2000) 
(“The political, not legal controls of the election booth, history’s regard, and impeachment on the 
one side, the demands of the Constitution and the system of precedent on the other, set a 
framework within which these allocations are made.”). 
22 Dellinger cites, albeit selectively, a handful of cases to support his contention that judges 
agree that “there are circumstances in which the President may appropriately decline to enforce a 
statute that he views as unconstitutional.” Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 199. See 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64, 176 (1926) (upholding the President’s dismissal of an 
Executive officer in violation of a statute requiring the Senate’s approval). More significantly, in 
Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Justice Scalia, writing for three other justices, 
commented that the President has “the power to veto encroaching laws, or even to disregard them 
when they are unconstitutional.” 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). 
23 See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 208-09. 
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that violates the [C]onstitution.”24 In other words, just as judges can 
pronounce the law unconstitutional (by exercising a power not explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution), so too can the President (by invoking 
another power similarly unmentioned). If neither the Court nor the 
Framers has stated that only the Court can pronounce on the validity of an 
act of Congress,25 then no bright-line constitutional impediment prevents 
Presidents from asserting such independent interpretive authority. 
Indeed, the Constitution’s open texture has allowed a number of Chief 
Executives, including Thomas Jefferson,26 Andrew Jackson,27 then–former 
President James Madison,28 and Abraham Lincoln29 to assert their authority 
 
24 Statement of James Wilson on December 1, 1787, in 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 443, 
446 (2d ed. 1901). It is not clear what Wilson means by “shield himself,” but he might be referring 
to the President’s ability to protect himself politically. In that event, Wilson’s point would speak 
to the importance of the democratic legitimacy that the President can bring to assessments of 
statutes’ constitutionality. 
25 This authority is distinct from who might get the final say, a point on which Chief Justice 
Marshall was unequivocal. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); see also 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever 
since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of 
our constitutional system.”). 
26 Jefferson propounded a rather virulent version of such coordinate interpretation:  
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [judges] a right to decide for the Executive, 
more than the Executive to decide for them. . . . The judges, believing the [Alien 
and Sedition] law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and impris-
onment; because that power was placed in their hands by the Constitution. But the 
Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execu-
tion of it; because that power has been confided to him by the Constitution. That in-
strument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 310-12 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897). 
27 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 183, 188-89 (2004) (describing Jackson’s veto of the Second Bank, which 
he deemed unconstitutional despite the Supreme Court’s holding to the contrary, and his 
reassertion of Jeffersonian departmentalism); JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW 
JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 211 (2008) (explaining that Jackson thought that the question of 
whether “a President should not simply defer to the will and wishes of the Congress or the 
judiciary,” but rather should advance his own position and speak for the people—“[w]hose vision 
would prevail . . . was an open question . . . in American politics”). 
28 See KRAMER, supra note 27, at 188 (noting Madison’s eschewal of departmentalism for 
greater acceptance of judicial primacy and theorizing that the viewpoint stemmed from “watching 
Andrew Jackson’s catfight with Congress over the Second Bank”). 
29 See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 190 (2005) (noting that Lincoln attacked the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision by 
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to interpret the Constitution independently. For many years, Presidents 
have asserted the right to decline to enforce statutes they deem unconstitu-
tional and have relied on their attorneys—attorneys working, in some cases, 
in institutions created by Congress30—to provide legal support for their 
contentions.31  
Finally, Congress itself has recognized the President’s prerogative to 
decline to defend (although not to decline to enforce) a constitutionally 
objectionable statute. In 2002, Congress reaffirmed its tacit blessing of a 
degree of presidential coordinacy—the President’s prerogative to interpret 
the Constitution for himself—in a provision of the 21st Century Depart-
ment of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,32 which requires the 
Attorney General to advise Congress when the DOJ elects not to defend a 
statute.33 The few courts mentioning this provision seem unperturbed by it,34 
and older cases note similar practices under earlier statutes.35 Further, the 
statute’s thirty-day deadline in anticipation of “enabl[ing] the House of 
Representatives and the Senate to take action . . . to intervene” in the case 
of the DOJ’s nondefense36 implies congressional acceptance of departmen-
talism and evidences that Congress sees itself, too, as a coordinate branch 
 
fastidiously focusing on its logical flaws); KRAMER, supra note 27, at 212 (discussing how 
“Lincoln . . . had criticized Dred Scott on departmental grounds when he campaigned for the 
Senate” and that, as President, he continued to ignore the Court’s opinion by “recognizing black 
citizenship in a range of contexts”); Paulsen, supra note 19, at 276-84 (discussing Lincoln’s 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and refusal to cooperate with Chief Justice Taney’s 
decision (while riding circuit) in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861), holding 
that suspension unconstitutional). 
30 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 87-88 
(2010) (“[P]residents . . . can rely on two executive branch institutions—the Office of Legal 
Counsel in the Justice Department and the Office of Counsel to the President in the White 
House—to give their constitutional imprimatur to presidential power grabs.”) 
31 E.g., Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 469 (1860) (“Every law is to be 
carried out so far forth as is consistent with the Constitution, and no further. The sound part of it 
must be executed, and the vicious portion of it suffered to drop.”). 
32 Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 8, 12, 15, 
18, 21, 28, 31, 38, 42, and 50 U.S.C.). 
33 See supra note 1. 
34 See, e.g., Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, Nos. 10-56634 & 10-56813, 2011 WL 
2683238, at *1 (9th Cir. July 11, 2011) (accepting that “[t]he Government, of course, may refrain 
from defending the constitutionality of ‘any provision of any Federal statute,’” but stating that, in 
response, “the court may allow amicus curiae to participate in oral argument in support of 
constitutionality” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006))). 
35 See, e.g., Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1043-44 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting a DOJ 
decision not to defend a statute and staying litigation for forty-five days, under a statute then in 
effect, to enable congressional intervention). 
36 28 U.S.C. § 530D(b)(1)–(2). 
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competent to intervene in litigation to assert the constitutionality of its own 
legislation. 
In sum, constitutional structure and scholarship, Supreme Court dicta, 
past presidential practice, and congressional acquiescence all point to the 
conclusion that Presidents often have discretionary authority—subject to 
political pressure—to choose whether to defend, and at times enforce, duly 
enacted statutes.37 In a sense, our system of government has accepted this 
practice. For example, as Adam Liptak has pointed out, one Solicitor 
General’s refusal to defend a Federal Communications Commission 
affirmative action program did not derail his career: “The [C]ommission 
filed its own brief defending the program, and the court upheld it. The 
acting Solicitor General who refused to defend the program, John G. 
Roberts, Jr., is now [C]hief [J]ustice of the United States.”38  
The question thus becomes what precisely a President should do, as a 
discretionary matter, about a statute he views as unconstitutional.39 Should 
 
37 There are, unsurprisingly, viable arguments for enforcing or defending a statute of ques-
tionable constitutionality. See, e.g., The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce 
Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4a Op. O.L.C. 55, 55-56 (1980) (contending that the 
Attorney General “can best discharge the responsibilities of his office by defending and enforcing 
the Act of Congress” since the Judiciary is the branch responsible for striking down unconstitu-
tional legislation); Drew S. Days, III, The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU 
L. REV. 73, 79 (1995) (“Because of the respect to which the Congress is entitled as a coordinate 
branch of government, Solicitors General traditionally have recognized a general duty to defend 
congressional statutes against constitutional challenges.”). 
Further, the issue of whether Presidents have the authority to decline to enforce or defend 
statutes before a Supreme Court decision upholding a statute’s constitutionality is different from 
the issue of whether Presidents have the authority to decline to enforce or defend statutes after a 
Supreme Court decision upholding the statute. While some have claimed or decried that “the 
President may decline to enforce a statute that regulates private individuals when the President 
deems the statute unconstitutional, even if a court has held or would hold the statute constitutional,” 
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 50 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), abrogated by 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), there seems to be little to the notion 
that the Executive can refuse to enforce—or defend—a statute once the Supreme Court has 
declared it constitutional. For the former proposition, Judge Kavanaugh in Seven-Sky cites to 
Justice Scalia’s partial concurrence in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 906 
(1991) (Scalia, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But while Justice Scalia does 
assert that the President has the power “even to disregard [laws] when they are unconstitutional,” 
id., he does not go as far as Judge Kavanaugh supposes: if the Supreme Court were to uphold a 
law, it would not be unconstitutional. As discussed below, the Dellinger framework is appropriately 
deferential to the Supreme Court’s view; the concern here is with a statute that the President 
believes is unconstitutional before the Supreme Court has spoken on the matter. 
38 Adam Liptak, The President’s Courthouse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at WK5.  
39 Cf. Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 521 (“The duties to defend and to enforce are 
anathema to the text, structure, and early history of the Constitution. . . . Rather than resting on 
the Constitution, the duties to enforce and defend . . . are grounded on the bureaucratic interests 
of the Department of Justice.”); Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1235 (“The question whether under 
these circumstances the Executive should continue to enforce and defend these statutes is not 
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the President’s exercise be solely predictive, or should he also seek to 
influence the ultimate outcome of a Supreme Court decision? In other 
words, must he strictly apply the Court’s legal framework, or does he have 
some prerogative to evaluate the statute’s constitutionality on broader 
principles?40 
B. Dellinger’s Discretionary Framework 
When the President chooses whether to enforce a statute he views as 
unconstitutional, he needs a test to guide his decision. The 1994 Dellinger 
Memorandum lays out a framework as a series of “propositions” that the 
President should follow in making a nonenforcement decision.41 We can 
divide these maxims by what they propose for the President’s role as 
President, his role with regard to Congress, and his role with regard to the 
Judiciary. 
First, with respect to the President’s role as President, Dellinger first 
points to the Take Care Clause42 and the Oath Clause43 for the proposition 
that “the President is required to act in accordance with the laws—including 
the Constitution, which takes precedence over other forms of law.”44 Part of 
this duty involves seeking to avoid unconstitutional interpretations when-
 
governed by a legal rule derivable from the Constitution itself; it is instead a matter of judgment, 
informed by a welter of historical and institutional concerns.”). 
40 Cf. David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-
enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 69-70 (2000). As Barron argues, “the Court’s 
decision to uphold a statute against constitutional challenge does not constitute a final determina-
tion that would preclude other institutional actors, unburdened as they are by equivalent 
obligations of deference, from reaching a contrary conclusion.” Id. at 69. Rather, tests like rational 
basis review are designed with the concern of “deference to the political branches,” id. at 70, since 
“[t]he Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident 
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is 
generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.” Id. at 
77 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Given that the Court’s doctrine “reflect[s] the Court’s own conception of the limitations 
of its decisional capacities,” the President might contend that “the political branches [may] make 
decisions on their own [and] do the kind of implementation of constitutional meaning that the 
Court will not itself perform.” Id. at 69-70. 
41 See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 200. 
42 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted . . . .”). 
43 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the 
following Oath or Affirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States.’”). 
44 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 200. 
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ever possible and “exercis[ing] . . . independent judgment to determine 
whether the statute is constitutional.”45 
Second, this Take Care duty also involves deferring to Congress when-
ever possible. Prophylaxis is preferable: the President should endeavor to 
correct unconstitutional provisions during the legislative process, before 
they become law.46 
Third, the President must more extensively consider his role in a hypo-
thetical dialogue with the Judiciary, which has the final say. If he believes 
that a statute’s unconstitutionality is unavoidable, he examines the implica-
tions of (and for) judicial review. Key to this assessment is whether the 
President believes that the Supreme Court would uphold the offending 
provision. If he believes the Court would side with his assessment of 
unconstitutionality, he should “weigh[] . . . the effect of compliance with 
the provision on the constitutional rights of affected individuals and on the 
executive branch’s constitutional authority,” as well as determine whether 
his action or inaction “will permit judicial resolution of the issue.”47 This 
inquiry also allows him to consider whether his course of action will 
facilitate review by the Supreme Court.48 
Dawn Johnsen has suggested a number of refinements to Dellinger’s 
framework by focusing on particular criteria, two of which are relevant here: 
(1) the clarity of the provision’s “constitutional infirmity,” and (2) the effect of 
nonenforcement on the likelihood of judicial review.49 These factors are 
consistent with Dellinger’s, but they add value because they shift the 
emphasis of the inquiry from deference to the Judiciary to the institutional 
competence of the Executive.  
First, Johnsen contends, the President’s own views of the Constitution 
should weigh more heavily where “the presidency, as an institution, 
possesses special expertise,” as with political or military issues.50 In other 
words, the President should not limit himself to a predictive analysis 
regarding how the Court would resolve the issue, but rather should assert 
his own expertise. 
Second, she proposes, Presidents might actively seek judicial review. 
Johnsen views ultimate judicial resolution of statutes as both better re-
specting the separation of powers and promoting “better constitutional  
 
45 Id. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 201. 
48 Id. 
49 Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 44 (2000). 
50 Id. at 45; see also id. at 45-46, 52, 56. 
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outcomes.”51 She cites Professor Eisgruber for the proposition that “insulat-
ed from electoral control, required to justify decisions by written opinion, 
and selected partly on the basis of technical proficiency, judges have the 
opportunity, the incentive, and the ability to interpret the Constitution 
carefully.”52 In the equal protection context in particular, the likelihood that 
the Court will enforce the asserted constitutional right depends in part on 
whether it will apply rational basis or heightened scrutiny,53 since the 
decision of which test to use is often outcome-determinative.54  
II. THE DISCRETIONARY FRAMEWORK  
IN THE NONDEFENSE CONTEXT 
The decision not to defend a statute is distinct from the decision not to 
enforce it. But largely because Dellinger constructed his framework for a 
hypothetical nonenforcement decision, this Part examines some of the key 
differences between the nonenforcement and the nondefense postures. For 
instance, President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that a bill depriving 
particular government appointees of their salary was unconstitutional as a 
bill of attainder, but he nonetheless enforced it by failing to reappoint the 
employees.55 His enforcement allowed the appointees to bring their action, 
but the Court also took note of President Roosevelt’s choice not to defend 
the bill56 in holding it unconstitutional.57 Because nonenforcement and non-
defense are distinct and do not necessarily operate in tandem, when the 
President confronts a decision of whether to defend a statute that he believes 
violates equal protection principles, he must understand these differences.  
 
51 Id. at 40. 
52 Eisgruber, supra note 19, at 354-55. 
53 Johnsen, supra note 49, at 48.  
54 Id. (explaining that judicial review is a “far more effective” means of declaring a statute 
unconstitutional when the Court employs a heightened scrutiny analysis rather than rational basis 
review); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitution-
al Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1978) (characterizing equal protection as “an underenforced 
constitutional norm,” as reflected in state tax and economic regulations being “broad[ly] 
exclu[ded]” from the reach of the Court’s interpretation of equal protection). For an example to 
which Professor Sager points, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
In this challenge to public school funding disparities, “Texas virtually concede[d] that its 
historically rooted dual system of financing education could not withstand . . . strict judicial 
scrutiny.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). However, the Court applied the rational basis standard, since 
poverty is not a suspect classification, and found that Texas had ample legitimate interests to 
justify its school funding system—despite the resulting unequal expenditures in different districts. 
Id. at 54-55. 
55 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 304-05 (1946). 
56 Id. at 305 n.1. 
57 Id. at 315. 
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In brief, I conclude that the takeaways from the distinction between non-
enforcement and nondefense must form part of the President’s inquiry. I 
begin first by pointing out that the Dellinger/Johnsen framework is easily 
adapted to the nondefense context. Then, I argue that some of the proposi-
tions from that framework actually apply with greater force in the nondefense 
context and thus deserve greater elaboration here: First, nondefense is less 
offensive to separation-of-powers principles, because it is more deferential to 
both Congress and the Court. Second, the framework may apply better to 
backward-looking (as opposed to forward-looking) decisions. Since non-
defense supposes continued enforcement of the offending statute, nondefense 
decisions are more likely to arise after an administration change (where the 
previous administration had enforced and defended the statute, in addition, 
very possibly, to signing it into law). When inheriting a statute he believes to 
be unconstitutional, the President is more likely to refuse to defend than to 
refuse to enforce it.58 It is only fitting, therefore, that the elaborated model 
include, where applicable, backward-looking criteria exhorting the President 
to consider, for instance, congressional motives59 and changed circumstances, 
as opposed to solely how the statute will fare before the Court. Finally, 
nondefense presents better prospects for securing judicial review, a crucial 
component of the framework. 
A. Applicability of the Dellinger/Johnsen Framework  
to Nondefense Decisions 
The Dellinger/Johnsen framework can be applied with only minor 
changes to nondefense decisions. First, both nonenforcement and nondefense 
scenarios share the same predicate: the President believes that a statute is 
unconstitutional and must eventually be nullified. Nondefense is simply a 
different mechanism for addressing the same conclusion. In both contexts, 
 
58 This point is—to my knowledge, at least—theoretical, rather than empirical, and deserves 
clarification. Theoretically, deciding not to enforce a statute is more controversial, and thus also 
more aggressive, than deciding not to defend it. As a result, I suspect, the President may have to 
expend more political capital to stop enforcing than to stop defending the same law; similarly, he 
is more likely in the case of nonenforcement to jeopardize any reliance interests in the law’s 
enforcement. In turn, these factors make a President more likely to refuse to enforce where he can 
avoid compromising reliance interests and lessen his expenditure of political capital by announcing 
before the passage of a law that he will refuse to enforce it. Consider, for example, President 
Clinton’s nonenforcement decision regarding the HIV provision. See infra note 60 and accompa-
nying text. In this theoretical structure, nonenforcement decisions thus would more likely be 
forward-looking. By contrast nondefense decisions would be more likely to be backward-looking. 
59 See Barron, supra note 40, at 80 (“Unlike the Court, the President need not necessarily 
assess the wrongfulness of the legislative motive through such a deferential screen [as rational 
basis].”). 
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the Take Care and Oath Clauses presuppose the President’s same constitu-
tional obligations to faithfully execute the laws of the United States. 
Second, in both the nonenforcement and nondefense contexts, the Pres-
ident considers his relationship with Congress and the Judiciary. The 
President’s Take Care and Oath obligations are the same in both contexts 
with regard to correcting unconstitutional bills during the legislative 
process: He has the same responsibility preventively to correct legislation 
that he would consider refusing to enforce or defend if it were enacted. 
Repeal, if viable, is equally compatible with nondefense.60 And if the 
President determines that a statute is unavoidably unconstitutional, 
Dellinger and Johnsen’s exhortations to consider judicial review make equal 
sense: nondefense presupposes ongoing (or at least imminent) litigation. 
The question thus becomes how any distinction between nondefense 
decisions and nonenforcement decisions—a distinction not fleshed out by 
the Dellinger/Johnsen framework—should matter to a President consider-
ing whether to defend a statute that appears to violate equal protection. 
B. Separation-of-Powers Principles 
Nondefense decisions better respect separation-of-powers principles 
than do nonenforcement decisions, and this characteristic makes them 
comport better than even nonenforcement decisions with the 
Dellinger/Johnsen framework’s contemplated role for the President in 
relation to Congress and the courts. Nondefense presents less of a concern 
that the President will butt heads with Congress, because nondefense (a) 
avoids executive lawmaking,61 (b) is symbolically more deferential by 
 
60 For example, President Clinton announced that, were a provision which would prohibit 
HIV-positive individuals from serving in the military not repealed, he would refuse to enforce it. 
See Chrysanthe Gussis, Note, The Constitution, the White House, and the Military HIV Ban: A New 
Threshold for Presidential Non-Defense of Statutes, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 597 (1997) 
(recounting Clinton’s dilemma prior to the provision’s repeal, as well as his instruction to the DOJ 
not to defend the law); see also Johnsen, supra note 49, at 54-58 (describing the circumstances and 
primary factors that influenced Clinton’s nonenforcement decision). 
61 Cf. Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal–Agent Problem, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1219-20 (2012) (explaining that “there is a difference between enforcing a law 
and defending it,” because defending a law “will not affect its operation at all,” but rather only 
“provide[] the court with [the Executive’s] understanding of what the Constitution requires” 
(citing Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889 (3d Cir. 1986) (“This claim 
of right for the President to declare statutes unconstitutional and to declare his refusal to execute 
them, as distinguished from his undisputed right to veto, criticize, or even refuse to defend in 
court, statues which he regards as unconstitutional, is dubious at best.”))); Eugene Gressman, Take 
Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 382 (1986) (arguing that “when the President tries to do 
more than he is permitted” by not faithfully enforcing a statute, “he becomes a lawmaker, a status 
foreign to the constitutional division of power”). 
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treating the statute as constitutional (as the President continues to enforce 
the statute), and (c) permits Congress to appropriate funds to defend the 
statute in court. Nondefense thus splits the difference: the President defers 
to Congress by giving the statute effect through enforcement and by giving 
Congress an opportunity to defend the law, but he also gives voice, particu-
larly in court, to his own concerns about the act’s constitutionality. As I 
discuss below, implementing this strategy allows a President concerned that 
a statute violates equal protection principles to increase the likelihood that a 
court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, will hear and resolve an issue of 
significant societal and legal importance. 
In continuing to enforce (but not defend) the offending act, the Presi-
dent also defers to the Judiciary, because nondefense often solicits the 
Court’s judgment, whereas nonenforcement might prevent facial challenges 
for lack of a case or controversy.62 Inasmuch as the President makes 
nondefense a legal or moral matter, nondefense may encourage the Court to 
take the case,63 and, having done so, to adopt the President’s argument.64 
The high percentage of Supreme Court cases in which the government is 
involved suggests as much.65 
 
62 Another drawback to nonenforcement is that minorities affected by the law might fear a 
decision by the same or a subsequent administration to enforce the statute, thereby forcing those 
minorities to challenge the statute in a more hostile political regime and without the Executive’s 
support. On the other hand, if the supportive Executive enforces the statute, he allows those 
minorities to challenge it in court, and can make affirmative arguments against the statute’s 
constitutionality in the ensuing litigation. See infra Section IV.C. Additionally, even while 
presidential nonenforcement might temporarily nullify a federal statute, parallel state statutes 
could extend the same discrimination unabated, without a Supreme Court holding that would also 
abrogate the state discrimination. Litigants would then have to challenge the practice on a state-
by-state basis until and unless the United States Supreme Court resolved the case. 
63 “Jawboning, or moral suasion, . . . can . . . encourage the Court to take action.” KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 98 (2007). 
64 See RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 8-9 (2012) (introducing a statistical study “point[ing] toward one 
unmistakeable finding”: “the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] does not simply succeed 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, it actually influences the Court throughout its decision-making 
process”); id. at 72-91 (interrogating and discussing the OSG’s influence on merits outcomes and 
concluding that “[w]hen compared to other attorneys with similar experience who enjoyed similar 
backgrounds and contextual advantages, the OSG still was much more likely to win its cases”); id. 
at 92-112 (discussing the influence of OSG briefs and noting that “the Court borrows more 
[language] from OSG briefs because it trusts the professional judgment of the lawyers within that 
office”); id. at 113-33 (discussing the influence of the OSG on legal doctrine); see also REBECCA MAE 
SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 94-100 (1992) (explaining why the 
Solicitor General has been called the “Tenth Justice” due to his influence before the Court). 
65 See Office of the Solicitor General: About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www. 
justice.gov/osg/about-osg.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (“The United States is involved in 
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Similarly, nondefense might prompt the Court to consider a variety of 
arguments, some of which could help it to reach the best decision. In some 
cases, the DOJ might withdraw arguments it feels it cannot reasonably 
support—and what the DOJ thinks is reasonable is likely influenced by 
what the President, who can remove the Attorney General and Assistant 
Attorneys General at will,66 thinks is reasonable. Given this pressure, the 
Judiciary might receive a fuller range of arguments if Congress’s own 
litigators are allowed to intervene (including, under rational basis review, 
arguments based on post hoc rationality), rather than if the Court hears 
only from an ambivalent DOJ. First, as Devins and Prakash argue, the law’s 
proponents gain little when the President offers “a tepid defense” and 
“might admit [the law’s] constitutional infirmities.”67 Second, nondefense 
might encourage the Court to consider a diversity of congressional view-
points, because not all members of Congress will see the statute the same 
way.68 Ultimately, the statute will be defended; even if members of  
Congress lack standing,69 the Court can, and will, appoint amici to carry out 
the defense.70  
So whereas the nonenforcement model exhorts the President to consider 
what the Court would rule, nondefense in combination with enforcement asks 
the Court actually to rule. By ultimately deferring to the Court, the President 
neither usurps Congress’s authority, nor aggrandizes his own at the expense 
of the former.71 In the equal protection context, striking this balance is 
 
approximately two-thirds of all the cases the U.S. Supreme Court decides on the merits each 
year.”). 
66 Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (explaining that “Congress cannot reserve 
for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by 
impeachment,” since the President has removal power over Executive officers); accord Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-86 (1988). 
67 Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 572; see also Gorod, supra note 61, at 1239-41 (arguing 
that in “cases in which the Executive Branch does not actually believe the law is constitutional,” its 
“‘defense’ of a statute may actually undermine the interests of an adversarial system of justice 
more than it promotes them”); Johnsen, supra note 49, at 49-50 (arguing that the President can 
better serve the Court and promote inter-branch constitutional discourse by advancing “his actual 
constitutional views” while Congress offers its own). 
68 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244, 249 (1992). 
69 E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (holding that individual members of Con-
gress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act). 
70 See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 466 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court occasionally appoints amicus curiae to argue a position that no party to the case  
supports . . . .”). See generally Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici 
Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907 (2011). 
71 The Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence focuses on “encroachment and aggran-
dizement.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989). “[S]tatutory provisions that to 
  
2012] Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully Litigated 309 
 
particularly important: while the Court often has a countermajoritarian role 
to play,72 true change requires the cooperation of the political branches, which 
can also help convince the Court to weigh in in the first place. 
C. Forward- vs. Backward-Looking: The Need  
to Consider Changed Circumstances 
Much of Dellinger’s construct is forward-looking. Dellinger first points 
to bills “under consideration by Congress,”73 thereby suggesting that the 
President’s nonenforcement decision looks forward toward the enactment of 
pending bills. He similarly adopts a forward-looking perspective when he 
explains that the President should consider whether a provision “would violate 
the Constitution”74 (as opposed to whether it violates the Constitution).75 
 
some degree commingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of either aggrandize-
ment or encroachment,” may be permissible. Id. (emphasis added). If anything, the nondefense 
decision puts more power in the hands of the courts, which already have the power “to say what 
the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
Some have suggested that, from the perspective of constitutional law or political legitimacy, 
continuing to enforce an indefensible act is problematic. E.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 
535 (“[T]he Constitution never bifurcates the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, generally requiring the Executive to enforce laws but authorizing him to decline to 
defend them in some cases.”); Aziz Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) “Unconstitutional” Laws, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1001, 1025-27 (2012) (arguing that the Obama administration should not have 
uncoupled its decision to enforce the Defense of Marriage Act while not defending it); Aziz Huq, 
Half-Empty: The Obama Administration’s New DOMA Position May Help a Handful of Gay Couples at 
the Expense of All the Rest, SLATE (Feb. 28, 2011, 6:35 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/02/halfempty.html (“Holder’s distinction between taking a 
position in court and doing something in practice has an arbitrary feel.”). Yet there is still value in 
the incremental approach of enforcing but not defending—an approach that allows the President 
to respect the separation of powers while still presenting his own constitutional views.  
72 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) ( Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (“The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no 
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require 
that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed 
generally.”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting 
that, in future cases, courts may need to consider the question “whether prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for 
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”). 
73 See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 200. 
74 Id. (emphasis added). 
75 This forward-looking perspective is unsurprising given that the Dellinger Memorandum 
initially grew out of conversations regarding hypothetical nonenforcement decisions among Abner 
Mikva, then–White House Counsel; John (Jack) Quinn; then–Chief of Staff to the Vice 
President; and Walter Dellinger, who at the time was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel. Dellinger’s draft memo, and later OLC opinion, became all the 
more timely when the provision barring HIV-positive individuals from military service came 
across President Clinton’s desk. Conversation with Walter Dellinger, Partner, O’Melveny & 
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But the Dellinger/Johnsen framework applies better still to nondefense 
decisions because of their often–backward-looking nature. A President 
assessing whether a statute violates equal protection will likely have 
inherited that statute, and that question, from a prior administration. Any 
nondefense decision regarding the statute will necessarily be backward-
looking, especially because the President will likely continue to enforce the 
offending statute,76 which the previous administration had probably already 
enforced.77 
Backward-looking nondefense decisions demand attention to interven-
ing changes in both society and the law since the provision’s enactment, and 
therefore suggest that the President should expressly consider a “changed 
circumstances” factor. This criterion would allow the President to assess 
whether society, his understanding thereof, or the law have changed in ways 
material to his projections for—and prospective influence on—a future 
Court decision. Specifically, it would help him reflect on whether similar 
developments clarify what could not have been seen before: that the law is 
unconstitutional.78 Changed-circumstances analysis asserts, among other 
things, that Congress’s institutional competence as a prospective factfinder 
and lawmaker has reached a breaking point. Congress, perhaps gridlocked, 
cannot as easily account for and review the mismatch of its predictive 
efforts and reality; the Court and the President, as post-enactment actors, 
are better equipped to administer the requisite retrospection. In essence, a 
nondefense stance will ultimately ask the Court to consider changed 
circumstances. 
 
Myers LLP (July 13, 2012); see also Johnsen, supra note 49, at 54-58 (discussing President Clinton’s 
stance on the provision). Dellinger eventually advised President Clinton not to defend the statute, 
but Clinton nevertheless signed the offending statute into law (as part of the 1996 Defense 
Authorization bill). Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, & Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Briefing, (Feb. 9, 1996), available at 
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/02/1996-02-09-quinn-and-dellinger-briefing-on-hiv-provision.html. 
76 E.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305 n.1 (1946) (explaining that, although 
President Roosevelt believed the bill depriving the plaintiffs of their salary was unconstitutional, 
he nevertheless enforced it by not reappointing the plaintiffs). 
77 See also supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
78 E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality opinion) (noting the 
momentous social and legal changes with regard to gender and quoting Justice Bradley’s infamous 
concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring), in which he 
wrote that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman [sic] are to fulfil [sic] the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother”); see also infra notes 150-155 and accompanying text (discussing 
Frontiero and the failed attempt to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment). 
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D. The Heightened Need for Judicial Review,  
and How Nondefense Facilitates It 
If the President truly believes that a statute violates equal protection, he 
will want the Court to endorse his position. Nondefense facilitates striking 
the repellent statute from the books, as it presents better prospects for 
judicial review than does nonenforcement. By enforcing but not defending a 
statute, the President suggests that the statute’s constitutional infirmity is 
not clear, or, alternatively, that he either lacks political support for non-
enforcement or wants to assume a deferential separation-of-powers stance. 
As discussed in Section II.B, nondefense is less threatening than non-
enforcement, both because it is less assertive79 and because it still allows 
Congress to defend the constitutionality of the offending act in litigation.80 
When the President has serious doubts regarding a statute’s constitutionality, 
Congress may even be a more spirited advocate.81 Further, nondefense is 
also less threatening to separation-of-powers principles because it allows the 
Court to affirm the statute’s constitutionality.82 
Moreover, nondefense could embolden plaintiffs to bring test cases,83 
which would provide reviewing courts with a more expansive factual 
record.84 Further, DOJ advisory opinions85 and briefs can provide courts 
 
79 Nondefense is often a lesser-included element of most nonenforcement decisions. See 
Gussis, supra note 60, at 605 n.67 (“There are no instances where Presidents have not enforced, 
yet have defended, legislation.”). 
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 530D(b)(2) (2006) (contemplating congressional intervention by requiring 
the DOJ to notify the House and Senate “within such time as will reasonably enable” them “to 
intervene in timely fashion in the proceeding”); Johnsen, supra note 49, at 50 (explaining that, in 
cases of nondefense, “Congress remains free, through other attorneys, to present its defense of the 
statute in the litigation”). 
81 See supra notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text. 
82 At least, DOMA’s intervening defenders appear to think so: “There are currently seven 
other DOMA cases pending in district courts around the country in six different circuits. . . . This 
proliferation of cases is a product of the Department’s incoherent decision to implement-but-not-
defend DOMA.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. v. Gill, 
No. 12-13 (U.S. June 29, 2012). 
83 For instance, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of an FCC policy of “awarding 
preferences to minority owners in comparative licensing proceedings,” Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547, 558 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), 
over the DOJ’s argument that the law was unconstitutional, see Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26-27, Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547 (No. 89-453). 
84 Cf. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 953-91 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (presenting 
extensive findings of fact to assess whether California’s Proposition 8, which bans same-sex 
marriage, violated the Equal Protection Clause), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
85 See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 676, 745 (2005) (observing that the Executive Branch, unlike the judiciary, can 
issue helpful advisory opinions “in advance of any concrete controversy”). 
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with guidance based on the strength of their reasoning and their “power to 
persuade.”86 An advisory opinion may be particularly able to persuade the 
Court because the DOJ can draw on and synthesize the myriad administra-
tive perspectives regarding the unconstitutionality of the act as applied.87  
In sum, continuing to enforce the law without defending it helps trigger 
judicial review88 and, just as importantly, gives Congress the opportunity to 
reconsider the law (and thus its possible repeal) by forcing it to justify the 
provision in the ensuing litigation.89 Overall, executive nondefense deci-
sions can have the salutary effect of fostering productive constitutional 
dialogue among all three branches of government.90 The Court then has 
more angles from which to view the issue. As in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, the Court might disagree with the DOJ that the statute is unconstitu-
tional, and uphold it.91 On the other hand, this spirited dialogue may 
eventually persuade the Court to rule otherwise—as when it overruled 
Metro Broadcasting only five years later.92 
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR HEIGHTENED AUTHORITY  
IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION CONTEXT 
I am concerned in particular in this Comment with the President who 
faces the difficult decision of whether to defend a statute he believes 
violates equal protection. The President’s authority not to defend constitu-
tionally objectionable statutes is not uniform across all areas of constitutional 
law.93 While I have argued above that the Dellinger/Johnsen framework can 
 
86 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (describing how courts should analyze 
the rulings and interpretations of administrative agencies in certain circumstances). 
87 Cf. Theodore C. Hirt, Current Issues Involving the Defense of Congressional and Administrative 
Agency Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1377, 1378-84 (2000) (explaining the centralization of 
litigation authority in the Federal Programs Branch of the Civil Division of the DOJ and 
describing how the Branch develops expertise in considering a wide variety of agency programs). 
88 See Rao, supra note 21, at 548 (“Execution of the laws usually generates public awareness of 
the President’s actions and triggers the possibility of political and judicial review.”). 
89 See, e.g., supra note 60 (discussing President Clinton’s exertion of pressure on Congress to 
repeal the military HIV ban).  
90 See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Obama Administration Asks Court to Lift Ban on ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell,’ Again, POLITICO (July 14, 2011), http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0711/Obama_ 
administration_asks_court_to_lift_ban_on_dont_ask_dont_tell.html (describing the back-and-
forth between the Ninth Circuit and the administration). 
91 See supra note 82.  
92 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995), overruling Metro 
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 558 (1990). 
93 Historically, the Court has tended to defer to the President on certain matters, including 
national security, POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 30; see also Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216, 223 (1944) (holding, despite employing strict scrutiny, that Congress and the 
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be adapted to the nondefense context, in this Part I turn to my argument 
that the equal protection context is one of the more compelling areas for 
presidential assertion of the prerogative not to defend a statute. I assert that 
the President’s authority to make the nondefense decision is heightened in 
the equal protection arena. 
This authority—or responsibility—is especially compelling where the 
President determines that Congress’s classification should receive more than 
just rational basis scrutiny.94 First, I begin by incorporating equal protection 
scholarship to argue that the President has the duty to ensure the protection 
of underenforced rights. I then assert that he thus also has the responsibility 
to alert the Court, through nondefense, where circumstances warrant 
heightened scrutiny. Finally, after establishing this responsibility, I offer a 
new model for nondefense where the President believes that a statute 
should be evaluated under heightened scrutiny pursuant to the Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of equal protection. 
The President has his own institutional competencies, so I do not con-
tend that the standard he applies should be the same as that which a court 
reviewing the statute would apply. Instead, based on the factors discussed in 
this Part, I contend that the relatively open texture of Dellinger’s nondefense 
 
Court had to defer to the judgment of “the properly constituted military authorities”), immigra-
tion and naturalization, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (noting that with regard to 
immigration and naturalization, “[t]he obvious need for delicate policy judgments has counseled 
the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into this field”), formal sovereignty and territorial 
governance, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (noting that certain matters, such as 
“formal sovereignty and territorial governance . . . are best left to the political branches”), and 
“political questions,” see, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he basic question presented . . . in this case is ‘political’ and 
therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our 
country’s foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to 
negate the action of the President.”).  
This deference seems to be at its height when separation-of-powers concerns are themselves 
at stake—an acknowledgement the President must be given some room to protect his prerogatives. 
See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 201; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (recognizing the existence of the President’s 
authority to, at times, act contrary to a statutory command). The Justices implicitly agree that the 
President must be allowed to defend his vision of his own powers in court. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam) (“The Framers regarded the checks and balances . . . built into 
the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”). Further, in INS v. Chadha, the 
Solicitor General, far from defending the statute in question, attacked its constitutionality as 
“encroach[ing] upon the powers of the Executive in administering the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.” Brief for Appellant-Respondent, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 80-
1832, 80-2170, 80-2171), 1982 WL 607268, at *6.  
94 Cf. Eisgruber, supra note 19, at 356 (“Interpretive deference is more common in cases 
where structural, rather than rights-based, issues predominate.”). 
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decisionmaking model should be elaborated with greater precision for equal 
protection nondefense decisions. The refinements I offer help both to 
contextualize the exceptional nature of the nondefense decision (and thus 
serve as a limiting principle for future Presidents who might seek to 
aggrandize their office through selective enforcement or defense of statutes) 
and to emphasize the importance of the distinction between nonenforcement 
and nondefense in the equal protection context. 
A. The Case for Greater Authority Where Equal Protection  
Demands Heightened Scrutiny 
Where the President believes a statute is unconstitutional on equal pro-
tection grounds, and specifically where he believes the standard of review 
should not be rational basis, but rather a heightened form of scrutiny, he has 
increased nondefense authority and should engage in his own version of 
searching review before making the final decision of whether to defend the 
law. In this Section, I argue why we should have a new framework for 
presidential nondefense authority in such situations. I do not address other 
areas where one might argue that important rights are at stake—for 
example, the First Amendment and fundamental rights (including those 
protected by substantive due process). Rather, I contend that denial of 
equal protection is, as the Court first alluded to in its famous footnote in 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., a special case,95 fraught more than any 
other with the danger of majoritarian tyranny.96 
If the Court is underenforcing a constitutional mandate such as equal 
protection (ostensibly for separation-of-powers and institutional competency 
reasons97), and Congress has already taken a position the President deems 
unconstitutional, then the President must take a less deferential stance than 
the posture he usually assumes. The Court’s three-tiered review system 
should further inform his inquiry, but not constrain it.98 The President has 
an enhanced responsibility to (1) ensure protection of the underenforced 
right, and (2) alert the Court through nondefense that he believes that 
conditions warrant a stricter standard of review. The first proposition is an 
 
95 See 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
96 See generally LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1995). 
97 See Pillard, supra note 85, at 692 (arguing that when courts use rational basis review, they 
“leave it to the political branches to fill the enforcement gap”). 
98 See Barron, supra note 40, at 77-78 (“[T]he President’s substantive constitutional judgment 
in this instance most likely was not the result of a prediction about how the Court would rule if 
the case were put before it. . . . [T]he Court would have been likely to have upheld Section 567 in 
the face of a private challenge to it.”). 
  
2012] Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully Litigated 315 
 
extension, based on the Take Care Clause, of the Carolene Products princi-
ple: in a representative democracy, minorities risk unfair—and oftentimes 
unconstitutional—deprivation of rights enjoyed by the majority. And the 
second relies, to an extent, on the President’s special institutional compe-
tence in his ability to litigate and influence the Court, as well as to assuage 
the Court’s structural concerns regarding deference to the other branches. 
In an equal protection underenforcement situation, the President is not 
using his powers for self-aggrandizement: rather than seeking to usurp 
interpretive authority from the Court, the President is asking the Court to 
check the political branches more vigorously. Nor is he seeking to usurp 
Congress’s authority: the very question is not simply whether the Court 
would agree with the Executive, but whether Congress itself deserves 
deference, and if not, whether the Executive can (and should) help induce 
the Court to apply heightened scrutiny. This series of questions further 
helps to constrain nondefense decisions to higher-stakes contexts and 
thereby maintain the balance of power among the branches of government. 
1. The President’s Enhanced Responsibility to Ensure  
the Protection of Underenforced Rights 
The President has an enhanced responsibility to ensure protection of 
underenforced constitutional rights and mandates.99 I begin with Larry 
Sager’s contention that the history of civil rights in the United States 
empirically demonstrates that the Court—and, perhaps, the entirety of the 
federal government—sometimes underenforces important rights later 
recognized under the Constitution.100 I then assert that when the Court fails 
to enforce constitutional rights, the logical conclusion is that the onus falls 
on the President to do so. 
 
99 See Sortirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, The Canon and the Constitution Outside the 
Courts, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 267, 267 (2000) (asserting that the Constitution “imposes higher 
obligations upon legislatures, executives, and citizens generally to pursue constitutional ends or to 
secure constitutional rights”). 
100 See generally Sager, supra note 54; Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on 
the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410 (1993); see also generally ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 504-05, 586-87 (2002) (recounting 
Senator Charles Sumner’s “repudiat[ion of] the legitimacy of separate but equal facilities” as early 
as 1870, but the failure of his corresponding bill to pass, and noting the flagging “support for the 
idea of federal intervention to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments” in the South 
beginning around 1877). 
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a. The Court’s Underenforcement of the Constitution 
While the Court has not recognized a Carolene Products role for the Presi-
dent, it has recognized that the political branches are tasked with ensuring the 
vitality of a number of (potentially) otherwise underenforced constitutional 
rights. What is less clear is whether the Constitution substantively extends 
these rights—arguably it does not—or whether the Court simply recognizes 
that, because of the separation of powers, it is not the appropriate institu-
tion to flesh out those guarantees.101 Either way, though, this recognition 
lends support to the notion that the President likewise has a responsibility 
to ensure constitutional execution of the laws. 
Because the Court’s recognition of the role of Congress and the Execu-
tive comes in the form of deference—and thus the risk of its own  
underenforcement where the political branches fail to act—this tension 
between democratic lawmaking and majoritarian tyranny inheres in our 
democracy.102 Yet, as the following discussion of procedural due process and 
equal protection cases will show, the Court has continually reexamined where 
it draws the line between aspirational constitutional rights, the extension of 
which it entrusts to the political branches, and judicially enforceable 
constitutional rights, which individual plaintiffs can seek to vindicate. This 
constant boundary-line redrawing renders the territories on either side “up 
for grabs,” and suggests that the President might declare some zones more 
properly within the judicial domain as the meaning of equal protection shifts. 
The Court has explicitly recognized, in the deference it has shown to 
Congress and state legislatures in procedural due process cases in the 
administrative law context, and in equal protection cases concerning welfare 
and poverty, that when its standard of review is rational basis, the responsi-
bility for protecting certain classes of individuals falls on the elected 
 
101 For example, Neal Katyal explains that one position “with regard to judicial supremacy” is 
that “[t]he Court has the responsibility to interpret the Constitution, but the question of what 
remedies are appropriate to rectify a constitutional violation is left to the legislature. The Court 
retains jurisdiction to review the remedy if it does not satisfy constitutional concerns.” Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1359-60 (2001). This 
position can be explained by Larry Sager’s underenforcement work. Id. at 1370 (citing Sager, supra 
note 54, at 1213-15). Courts often evince this approach when they “fear imposing remedies due to 
their lack of expertise and their lack of political accountability, which can lead them to water down 
the substantive right to sidestep the remedy question altogether.” Id. at 1370. 
102 See, e.g., Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 659 (E.D. La. 1961) (“One 
of the purposes of the Constitution of the United States was to protect minorities from the 
occasional tyranny of the majorities.”), aff’d, 368 U.S. 515 (1962); Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373,  
388-89 (2007) (explaining that courts “limit[] majoritarian decisionmaking . . . whenever they 
vindicate any constitutional right”). 
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branches.103 The responsibility of the elected branches to act is the corollary 
of the Court’s underenforcement; it is the result of the Court’s explicit 
deference to Congress and state legislatures under rational basis scrutiny. 
In 1970, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court determined that New York wel-
fare recipients had procedural due process rights to a hearing before losing 
their benefits.104 That same year, though, in Dandridge v. Williams, the 
Court held that a Maryland regulation setting a maximum cap on welfare 
eligibility did not violate the Equal Protection Clause under the rational 
basis standard, because the state had a legitimate interest in “provid[ing] an 
incentive to seek gainful employment” by setting “a limit on the recipient’s 
grant.”105 The Court analyzed the regulation under the rational basis 
standard, despite its observation that “[t]he administration of public welfare 
assistance . . . involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings.”106 The decision of state officials deserved great deference—
it was not to be “second-guess[ed].”107 
Yet by 1976, the Court had cut back on Goldberg’s protections by hold-
ing, in Mathews v. Eldridge, that a disability-entitlement plaintiff had no 
procedural due process rights to a predeprivation hearing.108 The Court 
explained that, “[i]n assessing what process is due in this case, substantial 
weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals 
charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that 
the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitle-
ment claims of individuals.”109 That same year, in Washington v. Davis, the 
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause could not support claims of 
 
103 Cf. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (noting that the death penalty—and the 
limits thereon—falls largely to the legislatures, which are “constituted to respond to the will and 
consequently the moral values of the people” (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Here, the Court concedes 
that there are fundamental rights at stake, but essentially argues that the political branches are 
better positioned to flesh them out. See Pillard, supra note 85, at 694 (arguing that the political 
branches seem to have been given the responsibility to ensure quality of legal counsel or fair 
application of the death penalty). 
104 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970). In dissent, Justice Black’s dissent condemned the Court’s 
decision as “wander[ing] out of [its] field of vested powers and transgress[ing] into the area 
constitutionally assigned to the Congress and the people.” Id. at 274 (Black, J., dissenting). 
105 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970). 
106 Id. at 485; see also id. (“We recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the 
cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.”).  
107 Id. at 487. 
108 See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that procedural due process rights are to be assessed 
through a balancing test that includes taking into account the government’s interest in avoiding 
fiscal burdens). 
109 Id. at 349 (emphasis added). 
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disproportionate impact based on race.110 And in 1985, in Cleveland Board of 
Education v. Loudermill, the Court retrenched yet again by further reducing 
the amount of process required before a government employer may discharge 
an employee with a property right in continued employment.111 While similar 
analogues exist, for example, in the Court’s (and lower courts’) shifting 
willingness to imply a Bivens cause of action112 and in the First Amendment 
context,113 the bottom line is that the elected branches often get just what they 
want—great latitude due to the Court’s deference.114 
b. The Onus Falls on the President: A Carolene Products Perspective 
Given a Congress determined to legislate unconstitutionally, the Presi-
dent’s responsibility is not dissimilar to the responsibility that the Court 
recognized for itself in Carolene Products. In Carolene Products, the Court 
reasoned that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”115 
While the Carolene Products footnote imagines the Court as the branch best-
positioned to safeguard the rights of minorities, the footnote’s primary 




110 See 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the 
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing 
alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest 
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.”) (internal citations omitted).  
111 See 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985) (“[A]ll the process that is due is provided by a pretermina-
tion opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination administrative procedures as provided 
by the Ohio statute.”). 
112 For the case that implied a cause of action directly under the Constitution (specifically, 
the Fourth Amendment), see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). For a discussion of the shifting Bivens standards, see, for example, Carlos 
M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens 
Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2013). 
113 See Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of 
the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 75 (2000) (observing that the Court focused its 
energies on economic liberties rather than speech liberties before developing the modern 
understanding of the First Amendment). Schiller argues that the Court underenforced the First 
Amendment during the first decades of the twentieth century, and only began to offer greater 
protection for free speech as lower courts began “to lose faith in the ability of legislators [and 
administrators] to regulate speech.” Id. at 3. 
114 See also, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 35, 208 (discussing the limp protec-
tions extended in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004), in which the Court found that a 
basic military tribunal could satisfy due process concerns). 
115 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (1938). 
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of a statute, even if what motivates him to assess that unconstitutionality is 
his policy or his constituency.116 That idea is that constitutional values—
and, in particular, equal protection—are constraints with which we bind our 
own future democratic decisionmaking because we are concerned about our 
incapacity to restrain our prejudices and look out for those least well-
represented—i.e., the tyranny of the majority.117 We are concerned about a 
 
116 Cf. Gorod, supra note 61, at 1231-35 (arguing that “the Executive Branch is, of course, full 
of such appointees intended to ensure that the Executive Branch’s policymaking is reflective of the 
political and philosophical views of the President who heads it”); id. at 1236-37 (observing that “it 
is not surprising” that the Executive should have its own legal views, and that it can “present those 
views to the courts.”). 
117 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.14 (1982) (“Some classifications are more likely 
than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some 
legitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible 
with the constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled 
to equal justice under the law.”); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (laying out 
the four factors for determining whether a particular group should receive heightened scrutiny 
(quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986))). Justice Thurgood Marshall explored the 
relationship between equal protection and the constitutional concern with majoritarian tyranny in 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, in which he observed that “[p]rejudice, once let loose, is 
not easily cabined . . . In light of the importance of the interest at stake and the history of 
discrimination the retarded have suffered, the Equal Protection Clause requires us” to apply 
heightened scrutiny. 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall’s Constitution is highly aware of, and responsive to, 
society’s inability to cope fairly with the rights that the majority may seek to strip from 
minorities; he is concerned with how prejudices are perpetrated through the polity: 
The political powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its defining trait 
are relevant insofar as they point to a social and cultural isolation that gives the ma-
jority little reason to respect or be concerned with that group’s interests and 
needs. . . . 
The discreteness and insularity warranting a “more searching judicial inquiry,” 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938), must therefore 
be viewed from a social and cultural perspective as well as a political one. To this 
task judges are well suited, for the lessons of history and experience are surely the 
best guide as to when, and with respect to what interests, society is likely to stigma-
tize individuals as members of an inferior caste or view them as not belonging to the 
community. Because prejudice spawns prejudice, and stereotypes produce limita-
tions that confirm the stereo[]type on which they are based, a history of unequal 
treatment requires sensitivity to the prospect that its vestiges endure. In separating 
those groups that are discrete and insular from those that are not, as in many im-
portant legal distinctions, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York 
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.). 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472-73 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). Compare id., with 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1602, at 417-18 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 
1891) (“[From] that fundamental principle of republican government . . . it is not to be in-
ferred . . . that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to 
lay hold of a majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing 
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particularly severe case of underenforcement, and disturbed, perhaps, that 
there is something more sinister about a discriminatory denial of rights than 
a universal denial of rights. This intuitive sense of “Kant’s categorical 
imperative” in this context “describes an ideal to which every constitutional 
authority should aspire.”118 
The Carolene Products postulate holds no less true where that tyranny has 
shaped the status quo. For decades, equal protection has involved notions of 
legal change and the recognition that, in the past, the Court has not always 
enforced constitutional rights to equality to the appropriate degree.119 
Indeed, one of the core notions of the Court’s equal protection jurispru-
dence is that changed circumstances will uncover historically enduring, 
judicially permitted inequities.120 The Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education recognized as much.121 As Justice Breyer has written, “by 1954 it 
had become clear that racial segregation . . . had denied minority groups the 
very equality that the [Equal Protection C]lause sought to assure them.”122 
Deciding Brown depended on “applying not particular historical beliefs but 
the values that underlie” the Equal Protection Clause.123 Just before stating 
its conclusion—“that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place [because s]eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal”124—the Brown Court looked to “the extent of psycho-
 
Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that the 
courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they 
had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body.”). 
118 Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and 
Neglected Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309, 330 (2002) (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE, THE 
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000)). 
119 See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (tracing the changing notions of, and case law regarding, race 
and civil rights throughout the Cold War). 
120 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (“[T]he Equal 
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. . . . [W]e have never 
been confined to historic notions of equality . . . . Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.”). 
121 See 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological 
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. 
Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.” (footnote omitted)). 
122 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 78 (2010). 
123 Id.; see also id. at 150 (“[T]he Court, the legal community, and much of American society 
had begun to see the Plessy decision as legally wrong and the segregated society it helped build as 
morally wrong[—a wrong that] had worked incalculable harm.”). 
124 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
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logical knowledge”125 and how it had developed from the state of social 
science at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,126 decided half a century earlier.127 
Less well known, though, is the historical role that the President has 
played in the evolution of equal protection doctrine.128 If we accept Larry 
Sager’s argument that there is space between constitutional case law and the 
Constitution itself,129 then if the Court is underenforcing a right, another 
branch must attend to that space. And in the past, Presidents have done so. 
That the President, as a normative matter, should take an active hand in 
navigating these waters flows logically from the confluence of three primary 
factors. First, the underlying values—equal protection of minorities at the 
mercy of majoritarian tyranny, as recognized in Carolene Products—demand 
scrutiny of the majority’s motivations. But underlying Carolene Products and 
equal protection jurisprudence lies a compromise between determining what 
the Constitution might actually mean and deferring to Congress out of 
separation-of-powers concerns. The Court’s three-tiered equal protection 
framework, built upon this compromise, therefore wavers due to internal 
instability. Rules for intermediate scrutiny, for instance, “are at once 
deferential and overprotective.”130 That is, these rules can be both under- and 
overinclusive, as when they do not sufficiently scrutinize “‘actual’ legislative 
motivation,” at the one end, and when, at the other, they hold legislative 
motives “impermissible on the basis of doctrinal tests that are intended to 
evaluate motive without engaging in the kind of searching inquiry that 
might reveal the motive[s] to have been pure.”131  
This compromise is evident in both the heightened and strict scrutiny 
constructions: the point is not that that the government can never distin-
guish or “classif[y] on the basis of certain characteristics, including race, 
national origin, illegitimacy, and gender,”132 but that “[t]hese factors are  
 
125 Id. at 494. 
126 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
127 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95. 
128 See, e.g., DUDZIAK, supra note 119, at 25-26 (discussing President Harry Truman’s consid-
eration of African American voters in developing his pro–civil rights stance). 
129 See Sager, supra note 100, at 414 (pointing out that some “claims of justice” under the 
Constitution will not be upheld by the courts, but rather must be “affirmed by the institutions of 
popular government: Congress, the President, or their legislative or Executive counterparts in 
state and local governments” and describing this phenomenon as “a gap between the reach of 
constitutional case law and the reach of justice”). 
130 Barron, supra note 40, at 71. 
131 Id. 
132 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12-15, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Mas-
sachusetts, No. 12-15 ( July 3, 2012) available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/08/12-15-Mass-Gill-Petition-final.pdf [hereinafter Solicitor General’s Massachusetts 
Certiorari Petition].  
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so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that 
laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and 
antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or 
deserving as others.”133 In some ways, this tension is a natural consequence 
of the fact that the Equal Protection Clause means that “all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike”134 and the “practical necessity that most 
legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage 
to various groups or persons.”135 But the point is that while the Court’s test 
will not always be able to smoke out impermissible motivations, asking 
whether Congress had impermissible motivations is the right approach. 
Second, Congress, in the nondefense context, has by definition removed 
itself as a source of constitutional protection. That the President has not 
similarly removed himself does nothing to lessen the Carolene Products 
rationale that the “political processes” are unsuited to the task of protecting 
minorities. As the Court explained in Cleburne, strict scrutiny also relies on 
the fact that “such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legisla-
tive means.”136 In fact, the Take Care Clause, even in its weakest form, 
supports the notion that the President may have to be proactive in response 
to the deference that the Court might otherwise show to Congress. And 
third, separation-of-powers principles remain: one need not be a strong 
departmentalist to recognize judicial supremacy—that the Court gets the 
final say—while also recognizing the influence of persuasive advocacy to 
help the Court understand changed circumstances and their relevance.137 
These last two points are delicately intertwined: the Court both defers—
thereby possibly permitting Congress to violate the Constitution—as well 
as looks to popular and executive constitutionalism to help it interpret the 
Constitution’s shifting meaning—thereby providing an opportunity for 
presidential advocacy.138 Where changed societal circumstances suggest that 
 
133 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
134 Id. at 439. 
135 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
136 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added). 
137 Cf. Gorod, supra note 61, at 1254 (“It would seem far better in some circumstances to 
recognize that the Executive Branch cannot always act for the whole and to allow many parties to 
offer their competing visions of what the Constitution allows and to let the courts make the final 
determination.”). 
138 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 150 (explaining that the Court’s decision in Romer is 
“more interesting” because it “supported the gay rights position” than for its “legal analysis,” 
because the Court, no doubt aware of “high levels of support for the proposition that employers 
should not discriminate against gays and lesbians . . . was predicting the future”); see also Barry 
Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2602 (2003) (“But what 
those who complain about judicial review often miss is that consistent with the concept of popular 
constitutionalism, the judicial veto necessarily must fall within a range acceptable to popular 
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rational basis is no longer the appropriate test, the burden falls on the 
political branches to act accordingly.139 With Congress out of the equation, 
and the President unable to legislate (and unwilling not to enforce, given 
the resulting failure to create a justiciable controversy and the eventual 
election of another President), nondefense becomes the best choice. 
2. The President’s Responsibility to Alert the Court  
When Conditions Warrant Heightened Scrutiny 
The assertion that the President has responsibility to take action where 
Congress and the Court have failed might appear, at first, to raise separations-
of-powers concerns. Remember, however, that the action under considera-
tion is not whether the President effectuates Congress’s intent (at issue in 
nonenforcement decisions), but instead how the President directs the course 
of litigation (an executive branch responsibility).140 This question arises 
when the President disagrees with what Congress—not the Court—says the 
Constitution means with regard to a statute: Congress has asserted one 
understanding, the President disagrees, and the Court has not yet addressed 
the question. Through nondefense, the Executive is the branch most 
responsible for, and competent at, advancing arguments against the statute’s 
constitutionality.141 Although better at retrospection, the Court has a 
particular blind spot in its rational basis standard,142 which is too deferential 
 
judgment over time . . . .”); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution?: The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 87, 97 (1993) (finding empirically that the Court’s 1956–1981 “decisions not only 
have conformed closely to the aggregate policy opinions of the American public but have thereby 
reinforced and helped legitimate emergent majoritarian concerns”); Post & Siegel, supra note 102, 
at 384 (noting that while “[t]he very practices that ensure the democratic accountability of the 
American constitutional system thus seem also to endanger the integrity of American constitu-
tional law,” the Court nonetheless seems to “accomplish[] this remarkable feat” of “incorporating 
popular beliefs into the domain of legality”). 
139 Cf., e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary 
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 517-18 (2005) (“In the American 
constitutional machine, which does not quite ‘run of itself,’ courts have long been viewed as rights-
protecting, institutional brakes, while Executive departments and administrative agencies are 
institutional accelerators.”). 
140 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of 
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and 
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction 
of the Attorney General.”). 
141 For a discussion of whom the executive branch serves—i.e., who is the principal and who 
is the agent: Congress, the President, or the People?—see generally Gorod, supra note 61, at 1228-35. 
142 See supra notes 54 & 100; see also Richard H. Fallon, The Supreme Court 1996 Term—
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 64 (1997) (“[T]he Court does not 
always frame constitutional doctrine to ensure that constitutional values are protected to the 
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to a Congress that is now testing the very limits of this deference through 
the objectionable statute. Here, the Court’s standard has failed to keep pace 
with society’s understandings of equality, and the concern is that the Court 
is unlikely to raise the question sua sponte of whether it should adopt 
stricter scrutiny towards the statute143—scrutiny necessary to reach the 
correct outcome—if the President does not intervene.144 
The President has institutional competence that the Court lacks in the 
form of prospective factfinding capabilities.145 Unlike a court, the President is 
not bound to consider only those matters that the parties have brought before 
him or those which are properly susceptible of judicial notice.146 Rather, 
where the Court has historically deferred to the elected legislature and where 
the legislature has not only failed to act, but has taken arguably discrimina-
tory action, the President’s own assessment may reveal the injustice. In such 
circumstances, the President has the responsibility to take action on behalf 
 
fullest possible extent. . . . [S]ome constitutional tests reflect an implicit judgment that it would be 
too costly or unworkable in practice for courts to enforce all constitutional norms to their full 
conceptual limits.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative 
Democracy, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1442 (2004) (“Certain constitutional norms . . . may be 
judicially underenforced because of the institutional limits of courts, and left to the political 
processes for fuller enforcement.”). See generally Lawrence Sager, Material Rights, Underenforcement, 
and the Adjudication Thesis, 90 B.U. L. REV. 579 (2010) (defending the underenforcement theory). 
143 See Pillard, supra note 85, at 695 (discussing the importance of political branch action 
where the Court’s standard is deferential); Sager, supra note 100, at 419 (arguing that the gap 
between constitutional case law and the Constitution provides a strong reason “for valuing popular 
participation in the definition and implementation of justice”). 
144 As I describe below, the Solicitor General is able to exert an influence that private parties 
cannot. See infra subsection III.A.2.b. 
145 On comparative institutional competence, see Eisgruber, supra note 19, at 352 (“Interpre-
tive authority belongs to the most competent branch (or branches). . . . It directs each branch to 
justify deference (or the lack of it) by first identifying the purposes served by the Constitution 
and then making a judgment about which institutions are best equipped to pursue that purpose.”). 
On factfinding, see infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
146 Surely, courts do engage in their own factfinding, so they may not be limited even where 
the Executive does not exercise this institutional competence. See generally Brianne J. Gorod, The 
Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 25-37 (2011) (collecting 
examples of appellate courts looking outside the developed record on appeal “to point out the 
extent to which [courts rely] on extra-record facts in reaching their conclusion”); see also Michael 
Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
965, 971-72 (2009) (arguing that court decisions based on extra-record factfinding are “driven by 
evidence that the parties never explained and the meaning or importance of which they never 
contested”). But such factfinding may be neither uniform nor fair; rather, it is ad hoc and opaque, 
and so it may be adverse to both parties, as well as to the general public, which is bound by the 
resulting rule. See, e.g., Gorod, supra, at 9 (“Given this indeterminacy, it is problematic when such 
‘facts’ are ‘found’ by ad hoc methods without the benefit of rigorous testing and then provide the 
basis for consequential legal decisions.”). 
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of those denied equal protection of the laws, as he serves as the only official 
in our federal political system elected by a national constituency. 
Four factors militate in favor of increased Executive authority in the 
equal protection domain. Historically, (1) the political branches have been 
influential in the Court’s decisionmaking process; the deference that the 
Court shows the elected branches not only suggests that the President’s 
involvement will help to shape the doctrine, but also that his involvement is 
entirely appropriate and may be necessary to help counterbalance the 
deference the Court might otherwise be inclined to show to Congress. 
Moreover, (2) the Executive has demonstrated its efficacy in shaping equal 
protection outcomes and, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is 
perhaps the single most influential litigant. Further, as an Executive repre-
senting all the nation’s people,147 the President is more responsive to shifts 
in opinion, mood, and circumstances, and can thus (3) bring democratic 
legitimacy to litigation and (4) reinforce the legitimacy of judicial resolution 
through political accountability and influence outside of court.148 The 
argument for increased Executive authority in the equal protection context 
is fairly straightforward: Historically, the Executive has been effective in 
influencing the Court, the branch self-charged with protecting minority 
rights against the very majoritarian tyranny149 evinced by Congress’s 
decision to pass a statute that the President believes violates equal protec-
tion principles. The President’s litigators may be able to help the Court see 
that it again needs to exercise that countermajoritarian muscle. 
 
147 The Court has recognized the importance of the “national” perspective in the legislative 
process. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948 (1983) (“[I]t may be, at some times, on some 
subjects, that the President elected by all the people, is rather more representative of them all than 
are the members of either body of the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not 
countrywide . . . .” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). 
148 Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“While 
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is . . . .”); WHITTINGTON, 
supra note 63, at 21 (observing that the President, as a nationally-elected officer must be cognizant 
of maintaining a legislative coalition and thus “cannot be idiosyncratic in defining his agenda”). 
149 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 60-61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand 
enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other 
citizens. . . . Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time 
must be prevented, or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by 
their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.”). 
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a. Historical Influence of the Elected Branches on Litigation 
The elected branches can claim significant influence over the Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. The 
extension of heightened scrutiny to sex as a protected class is a perfect example 
of the Court’s deference to Congress in heightening its standard of review. In 
Frontiero v. Richardson, the plurality looked to congressional interpretations 
of the Equal Protection Clause under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the Equal Pay Act, and, finally, the passed (but unratified) Equal 
Rights Amendment (ERA), as significant interpretations of a “coequal 
branch.”150 Further, the plurality failed to secure the one additional vote it 
needed for a majority because Justice Powell preferred to defer to Congress 
and the People by waiting for the ERA’s ratification.151 Thus, while the 
ERA itself was never ratified by a sufficient number of states, the Court’s 
subsequent jurisprudence resulted in a “de facto” ERA, with substantially 
the same provisions.152 
Both the plurality’s failure to secure an extra vote as well as the resulting 
“de facto” ERA evince the importance of elected-branch signaling in 
litigation. Justice Powell’s refusal to join the majority demonstrates that 
Justices are concerned with legislative and popular interpretations of the 
Constitution; at the same time, the “de facto” ERA shows that “[t]he social 
changes that did not quite produce the Equal Rights Amendment” nonethe-
less moved the Court to “produce[] a de facto ERA in the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence.”153 Proponents of the ERA had openly argued 
that influencing the Supreme Court was one of the objectives of the 
amendment process.154 Their advocacy ultimately traced back to 
 
150 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“Congress itself 
has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a 
coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under consideration.” 
(emphasis added)). 
151 See id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the ERA provides a 
“compelling reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the 
strictest test of judicial scrutiny” and arguing that the Court’s “reaching out to pre-empt by 
judicial action a major political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect 
appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes” (internal punctuation omitted)).  
152 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1368 (2006) (observing that the 
change “began in the executive branch, . . . spread to Congress, and then finally to the Courts” 
(emphasis added)). 
153 Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 984-85 (2002); see also 
Siegel, supra note 152, at 1332-39 (observing that, even though the Equal Rights Amendment was 
not ratified, many have seen it as successful because the Court has essentially adopted the standard 
it contained in cases whose “precepts . . . are now canonical”). 
154 See Siegel, supra note 152, at 1368. 
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“[c]hange . . . in the executive branch, led by women convened by President 
Kennedy’s Commission on the Status of Women.”155 
Another analogue is the Court’s recognition of the repeal of state  
sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas.156 Overturning Bowers v. Hardwick,157 the 
Lawrence Court noted that both state legislatures (through repeal) and state 
executives (through nonenforcement) had alerted it to changed circum-
stances.158 Similarly, the Court has also indicated its receptivity to agency 
decisionmaking as constitutional interpretation.159 As Gillian Metzger 
points out, in some contexts, “specific administrative mechanisms are not 
constitutionally mandated but suffice to avoid constitutional violations.”160 
For example, as in Wilkie v. Robbins, when administrative complaint systems 
are robust enough, their existence can militate against the Court’s implica-
tion of a Bivens cause of action for a plaintiff seeking redress for constitu-
tional violations by federal officials.161 
The influence of the elected branches on doctrine can be significant. The 
examples discussed here, and in the discussion of due process and welfare 
rights cases above,162 suggest that the Court, concerned about its democratic 
legitimacy, will often look to an elected branch to take the first steps. When 
Congress will not, the President may have to lead by example. 
b. The Executive as Litigator 
Unlike Congress and most federal agencies, the President, through the 
DOJ and the Solicitor General, is already a litigator—and an effective 
 
155 Id. 
156 See 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding that a law criminalizing same-sex intercourse 
violated the Due Process Clause). 
157 See 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state law criminalizing sodomy). 
158 See 539 U.S. at 573 (“The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced 
in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual 
conduct. In those States where sodomy is still proscribed, . . . there is a pattern of nonenforcement.”). 
159 Gillian Metzger argues that agencies, knowledgeable about the regulatory schemes they 
enforce, are capable of effectively enforcing constitutional norms. Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 497-505 (2010). He 
points to cases where the underenforcement of constitutional rights passes the opportunity for 
realization of the Constitution to administrative agencies. Id. at 500. 
160 Id. at 488. 
161 551 U.S. 537 (2007). Professor Metzger cites to Wilkie, in which the Court held that 
finding an implied private right of action based on the Court’s previous holding in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971), would be 
inappropriate, because administrative remedies were available. Metzger, supra note 159, at 488 
n.28 (citing Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 552-53). But see supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra subsection III.A.1.a. 
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one.163 Therefore, through nondefense, he has a unique structural institu-
tional competence over Congress in alerting the Court to a statute’s 
unconstitutionality. The DOJ’s position-taking may even help encourage 
plaintiffs to bring further cases, and thus create the kind of national legal 
issue that will make the case all the more appealing to the Supreme 
Court.164 
Once litigation rises to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General has 
advantages shared by few other litigators. He is more likely than any other 
actor to secure Supreme Court review, and also to win once certiorari is 
granted.165 As Ryan Black and Ryan Owens have found in their empirical 
study of the Office of the Solicitor General’s (OSG) success at the Supreme 
Court, the data “points to considerable Solicitor General influence over 
Supreme Court opinions.”166 Statistically ruling out explanations of better 
Solicitor General experience or strategic case selection,167 Black and Owens 
concluded that “the Court borrows more from OSG briefs because it trusts 
the professional judgment of the lawyers within that office,” and “that the 
OSG is indeed influential before the Court.”168 The OSG’s recommenda-
tion makes it considerably more likely that the Court will “treat . . . 
precedent favorably”; likewise, a negative OSG recommendation makes it 
far more likely that the Court will “negatively treat precedent by distin-
guishing it or overruling it.”169 Based on a comprehensive literature review 
and their own statistical results, Owens and Black concluded that “OSG 
recommendations, in short, drive doctrinal change.”170 These findings are 
relevant because they suggest that through the Solicitor General, the 
President can hope not simply to predict the course of the Court’s doc-
trine—and whether it will adequately protect minorities from majoritarian 
tyranny—but also to influence those judicial outcomes that he must accept as 
law. And he can hope to do so in a way that private litigants simply cannot. 
 
163 See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 61, at 1212. 
164 See supra note 82. 
165 See BLACK & OWENS, supra note 64, at 23. 
166 Id. at 111. 
167 See id. at 111-12 (“If the OSG were so successful before the Court because its attorneys 
have more experience than non-OSG attorneys, we would have observed the Court borrowing the 
same amount of language from OSG briefs and non-OSG briefs when matching on attorney 
experience. . . . [And p]ut plainly, if the OSG were picking cases strategically that it knew it 
would win, we would not retrieve the results our models produced.”). 
168 Id. at 112. 
169 Id. at 132-33. 
170 Id. at 133; see also Lincoln Caplan, The President’s Lawyer, and the Court’s, N.Y. TIMES, May 
18, 2001, at A19 (“The Supreme Court has bestowed on the [S]olicitor [G]eneral a special status—
seeking the [Solicitor General’s] advice in many cases where the government isn’t even a party. 
And the [Solicitor General] has reciprocated by fulfilling a special role in court.”). 
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History, too, instructs on the power of presidential involvement in liti-
gation, even before it reaches the Supreme Court. Presidents Truman’s and 
Kennedy’s DOJs were very active in influencing the Court’s equal protection 
decisions from the 1940s through the 1960s, but these efforts began long 
before the controversies reached the Justices.171 For instance, in Simkins v. 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, the Attorney General’s tactic of support-
ing the plaintiffs in attacking a federal law tolerating segregated hospital 
facilities helped move the Fourth Circuit to strike down the law.172 Simkins 
followed a long tradition of Cold War agenda-setting before the Court by 
President Truman’s DOJ,173 which began its campaign with an amicus brief 
in Shelley v. Kraemer,174 in which the Court held that state action to enforce 
a racially discriminatory restrictive covenant violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.175 After the President’s Committee on Civil Rights advanced three 
reasons—moral, economic, and international—for redressing civil rights 
abuses,176 President Truman, concerned about the international perception 
of racism in America and finding that he could not count on Congress to 
address these problems, directed the DOJ to argue his position to the 
Court.177 Thus, the movement that began with invalidating discriminatory 
restrictive covenants moved on to tackle “international implications of 
segregation” with the DOJ’s involvement in opposing the discriminatory 
position of the Interstate Commerce Commission178 in Henderson v. United 
States.179 Eventually, the DOJ participated in Sweatt v. Painter,180 McLaurin 
v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,181 Brown v. Board of Educa-
 
171 See generally DUDZIAK, supra note 119, at 90-106, 178-202. 
172 323 F.2d 959, 969 (4th Cir. 1963); see also P. Preston Reynolds, Professional and Hospital 
Discrimination and the U.S. Court of Appeals: Fourth Circuit 1956-1967, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 710, 
713 (describing the Justice Department’s stance in support of the plaintiffs’ successful contention 
that the use of federal funds in a discriminatory manner is unconstitutional). 
173 See DUDZIAK, supra note 119, at 90-106.  
174 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 
(Nos. 72, 87, 290 & 291). 
175 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23. 
176 See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 101-02 
(1988) (describing how President Truman took important steps towards racial equality by 
desegregating the military by Executive order). 
177 Id. at 103-05. 
178 Id. at 106. 
179 See 339 U.S. 816, 826 (1950) (holding that segregation in railroad cars violated the Inter-
state Commerce Act). 
180 See 339 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1950) (striking down, as violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Texas’s policy prohibiting blacks from attending an all-white law school). 
181 See 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950) (holding that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a black 
graduate student was entitled to equal treatment from a state-supported school as students of 
other races). 
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tion,182 and Bolling v. Sharpe.183 Just as Robin West argues that Congress 
“exists to do distributive justice” by enacting the “aspirational Constitu-
tion,”184 the President could be said to exist (at least in part) to do distribu-
tive justice by litigating the aspirational Constitution. And in those rare 
cases in which the Solicitor General raises the President’s concerns with a 
statute’s constitutionality, the Court listens.185 
Finally, the President has other capabilities well suited for alerting the 
Court to the need for a heightened standard of review. Through his 
command of the Executive Branch, he can move faster than either Con-
gress186 or litigation. This increased speed can help to ameliorate depriva-
tions that subject minorities to continuous harm.187 Similarly, his 
nondefense decision can give the DOJ and other agencies the space they 
need to read the Constitution broadly and assert such expansive arguments 
in and out of court.188 President Kennedy, for instance, issued an Executive 
order declaring discrimination in federal employment and contracting 
unconstitutional, establishing the President’s Committee on Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity, and directing agencies “to initiate forthwith studies of 
current government employment practices within their responsibility.”189 A 
year later, Kennedy issued another order, requiring “all [relevant] depart-
ments and agencies in the executive branch . . . to take all action necessary 
and appropriate to prevent discrimination because of race, color, creed, or 
national origin” in housing, and appointing a Committee to oversee agency 
progress.190 At first glance, this analogue to the nondefense context seems 
 
182 See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.”). 
183 See 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (extending Brown’s holding to the District of Columbia 
under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause). 
184 ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 311-12 (1994). 
185  See, e.g., Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1081-83 (2001). 
186 Consider the problem of the filibuster: “sixty votes . . . are commonly required to enact 
major and controversial legislation.” WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND 
THE POLICY PROCESS 272 (8th ed. 2011). 
187 See Pillard, supra note 85, at 689 (“[E]ven where private parties can get courts to respond 
to their constitutional harms, they may face interstitial deprivations. Individuals suffer injury in 
the time lag between constitutional harm and relevant judicial response.”). 
188 For example, President Kennedy encouraged the Federal Communications Commission 
to affirmatively read the Constitution to apply equal employment opportunity policies against the 
broadcasters it regulated, even as the FCC continued to receive a “cool reception” from most of 
the rest of the federal government. See Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative 
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 811-12, 820 (2010). 
189 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961). 
190 Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 24, 1962).  
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imperfect, since nondefense involves slow-moving litigation. However, the 
fact that the President can move swiftly through other, nonlitigation channels 
means that he can coordinate policy, repeal, and public outreach efforts with 
nondefense—a strategy unavailable to Congress. In turn, these efforts have 
the potential to make litigation efforts themselves more effective.191 
Once litigation has begun, the President’s institutional capacity to act 
swiftly comes into play yet again as a tool for elaborating constitutional law. 
If the President is convinced that a statute violates equal protection, then 
the DOJ can push for recognition of rights and equality, as it did in its 
lower-court litigation in Plyler v. Doe.192 And he can push the DOJ and 
Solicitor General to take consistent positions to help ensure that the issue 
reaches the Supreme Court.193 Indeed, his nondefense decision is important 
because it may help push the Supreme Court to accept his view when it 
might otherwise remain deferential to an intransigent Congress through the 
rational basis standard. 
c. Bringing Democratic Legitimacy to Litigation 
The democratic legitimacy of the President bolsters his authority,194 and 
especially so given the Court’s receptiveness to changing notions of equal 
protection.195 The Executive’s institutional competence as a litigator and the 
President’s national constituency render the Executive the best branch for 
signaling to the Court that it should change its standard of review. Indeed, 
the Executive is the only branch capable of doing so—if the desired change 
 
191 See Pillard, supra note 85, at 749 (noting that, unlike the courts, the elected branches have 
institutional competencies in “agenda-setting and factfinding,” and the executive branch also has 
capacity to “prioritize, lead, and set an example for other political officials”). 
192 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 593 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that denying education to 
children of illegal immigrants violates the Equal Protection Clause), aff’d, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 
1980), aff’d, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The DOJ dropped its equal protection arguments in its amicus 
brief at the Supreme Court, because of its “view that this is an issue that affects state rather than 
federal interests.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5 n.3, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202 (1982) (Nos. 80-1538 & 80-1934). 
193 See infra Part IV.C; see also Solicitor General’s Massachusetts Certiorari Petition, supra 
note 132, at 12 (“[W]e respectfully seek this Court’s review so that the question may be authorita-
tively decided by this Court. . . . [T]o ensure that the Judiciary is the final arbiter of Section 3 [of 
DOMA]’s constitutionality, the President has instructed Executive departments and agencies to 
continue to enforce Section 3 until there is a definitive judicial ruling that Section 3 is unconstitu-
tional.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 10, Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. 
Golinski, No. 12-16 (U.S. July 3, 2012) (same) available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/12-16-Golinski-Petition-final.pdf. 
194 By contrast, scholars note that the Court lacks democratic legitimacy. See Jeremy Wal-
dron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1391 (2006) (explaining that 
legislators, unlike judges, are accountable to their constituents). 
195 See supra subsection III.A.1. 
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would ratchet up the level of scrutiny—when Congress is acting unconstitu-
tionally. Unlike Congress, the President can combine nondefense in the 
courts with position-taking outside the courts.196 Specifically, he can urge 
repeal of the offending statute, release public statements, issue Executive 
orders, and, in the process, foster dialogue that helps repopularize the 
democratic process.197 To a degree, these actions may help assuage the 
Court’s concerns that striking down a statute—a countermajoritarian act—is 
antidemocratic. If the President ultimately influences the Court’s decision 
and also fosters popular dialogue about the provision at issue, then the 
President will have, in a sense, helped to democratize and aspirationalize 
the Constitution. 
d. The President’s Accountability Outside the Courtroom 
While in-court advocacy is consistent with the President’s political 
role,198 the President’s out-of-court advocacy deserves further attention. As 
a political actor, he can also seek to change hearts and minds199 in ways that 
the Court cannot.200 And the President is politically accountable when he 
 
196 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 63, at 98-100 (noting that “[e]lected officials can 
encourage appropriate judicial action through . . . public statements” and providing examples). 
197 Cf. KRAMER, supra note 27, at 227-48 (arguing for a return to the popular constitutional-
ism of the Founding Generation). Perhaps this argument is simply a restatement of the notion 
that, given the Framers’ intended checks and balances, the President should check the legislature 
by making his own constitutional interpretations. 
198 See Carlos A. Ball, When May A President Refuse to Defend a Statute? The Obama Admin-
istration and DOMA, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 77, 89 (2011) (arguing that, when the 
constitutional question involves assessing whether the targeted group has long suffered “invidious 
discrimination” irrelevant to ability, the President confronts “broad normative and policy 
questions that should give [him] greater . . . authority to make independent constitutional 
assessments”). 
199 E.g., Remarks on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Administration, 
2 PUB. PAPERS 1106 ( July 19, 1995). President Clinton asked: 
How did this [progress in confronting racism] happen? Fundamentally, because we 
opened our hearts and minds and changed our ways. But not without pressure—the 
pressure of court decisions, legislation, Executive action, and the power of examples 
in the public and private sector. Along the way we learned that laws alone do not 
change society; that old habits and thinking patterns are deeply ingrained and die 
hard; that more is required to really open the doors of opportunity. 
Id. at 1108. 
200 The aftermath of Brown revealed that changed hearts and minds do not necessarily result 
from legal rulings. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 404-
05 (1999) (describing Eisenhower’s eventual decision to use troops to enforce Brown’s holding and 
stop the constitutional violation of ongoing segregation at an Arkansas public high school). 
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decides not to defend a statute.201 He can always do nothing, and in essence 
tell constituents either to turn to Congress or to rely solely on the courts. 
But as the official with the broadest constituency, he can also speak with a 
political voice. 
*      *      * 
The bottom line is that, where the Court underenforces the Constitu-
tion—whether with regard to procedural due process for welfare benefits, 
the First Amendment, or equal protection under a rational basis standard—
the Executive and Legislative branches retain the power to interpret the 
Constitution above the floor that the Court has established.202 But some-
times Congress not only fails to erect an adequate ceiling—that is, by 
extending rights or entitlements above and beyond what the Constitution 
requires—but also digs into the floor’s very foundations by enacting a 
statute depriving some minority of the equal protection of the laws. In such 
circumstances, the Executive bears the responsibility of persuading the 
Court to elevate its level of scrutiny from rational basis to a heightened 
standard. This responsibility is especially acute where the questionable 
classification resembles race and sex in its immutability. Nondefense 
appropriately responds to the gravity of denying minorities the equal 
protection of the laws by increasing the probability that the Court will hear 
the case and address the ongoing deprivation of individuals’ rights. 
B. A New Model for Nondefense Decisionmaking 
In this Section, I present my modifications to the Dellinger/Johnsen 
framework for the equal protection context. I begin by explaining why a 
new model is necessary. Even the weakest argument for these modifications 
reveals the need for a new decisionmaking framework: The President who 
must decide whether to defend a statute he believes should receive, and 
would fail, heightened equal protection scrutiny requires a decisional 
framework. So long as it is reliable, and all else being equal, the standard 
 
201 See Gorod, supra note 61, at 1243-44 (explaining that the public will often “assume that the 
views the Executive Branch is expressing are its own,” so “forcing the Executive Branch to make 
arguments in which it does not belief—or prohibiting it from making affirmative arguments in which 
it does—hurts the President’s ability to effectively use his office as a bully pulpit”); Rao, supra note 
21, at 553 (pointing out that the People can hold the President accountable if they disagree with 
his decision not to enforce a statute). 
202 Cf. Strauss, supra note 21, at 114 (“[A]s the judicial definition is taking shape, there is 
nonetheless substantial legitimate room for the executive branch to assert and persist in its own 
readings of legal authority.”). 
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that gives him the most guidance will also be the most helpful. After 
demonstrating the usefulness of these modifications, I present the additional 
questions that constitute the modified model. Finally, as a thought experi-
ment to address the concerns raised earlier in the Section, I offer how the 
model would impact a nondefense decision outside the equal protection 
context. 
1. Why a New Model is Necessary 
I propose modifications to the Dellinger/Johnsen model for two primary 
reasons. First, while I have argued that Dellinger’s nonenforcement frame-
work can be adapted to the nondefense context, the foregoing discussion 
reveals that there are concerns that are particularly salient in the equal 
protection context: the President has both the responsibility and the ability 
to help influence the Court’s development of equal protection jurisprudence 
that protects minorities who have experienced pervasive discrimination. 
The modified model that I propose better accounts for those instances in 
which the President believes that the Court should apply heightened 
scrutiny to find a statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Concededly, Dellinger’s model is able to accommodate equal protection 
cases. In fact, in 1996, Dellinger advised President Clinton not to defend a 
statute that would require the discharge of all HIV-positive members of the 
military on equal protection grounds.203 Clinton accepted this advice after 
conferring with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and concluding that “the provision 
does not serve any valid military or other purpose.” He resolved that the DOJ 
would not defend its constitutionality if it was challenged in litigation.204 
There, however, Assistant Attorney General Dellinger and Counsel to 
the President Jack Quinn relied on an argument based on rational basis 
review.205 It was not, according to their reasoning, a circumstance in which 
the Court should apply heightened scrutiny; the statute did not classify on 
the basis of an arguably innate, immutable condition. Similarly, of the 
historical nondefense decisions to which Dellinger could point, only 
 
203 See Quinn & Dellinger, supra note 75 (statement of Walter Dellinger). 
204 Id. 
205 See id. (statement of Jack Quinn) (“[T]he question the courts ask is, is there a rational 
basis for this discrimination? Does it serve some valid, legitimate, rational government objective? 
The people to whom that question is properly put by the President are the Secretary of Defense 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.”). 
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Simkins206 and Gavett v. Alexander207 involved equal protection issues, and 
only Simkins addressed a standard more searching than rational basis.208 
Therefore, the nondefense decisionmaking model deserves further elab-
oration for situations implicating equal protection concerns, where the 
Court might employ a standard too deferential toward Congress—i.e., 
rational basis review instead of heightened scrutiny. The modifications I 
suggest would help a decisionmaker appropriately balance important 
separation-of-powers concerns with alleged infringements of individual 
rights. They also help point the way toward actions the President can take 
to further the democratic legitimacy of an eventual nondefense posture. 
Second, these modifications serve to highlight the sui generis nature of 
presidential nondefense decisions in that subset of equal protection cases 
where the President believes that the Court should apply heightened 
scrutiny. Crucially, the inquiry, as a whole, can serve as a limiting principle 
for Presidents who, in the words of Orin Kerr, would like “a great deal of 
power to decide what legislation to defend, increasing executive branch 
power at the expense of Congress’s power. . . . [I]t will be a power grab 
disguised as academic constitutional interpretation.”209 My proposed 
modifications impel the President to ask more questions, not fewer, and 
exhort him to justify, more comprehensively, an ultimate decision not to 
defend a statute. Moreover, because they focus on the equal protection 
context, the modifications mitigate slippery slope arguments against non-
defense, namely that future Presidents could assert the authority not to 
enforce laws, such as the Affordable Care Act, based on policy disagree-
ments expressed as Commerce Clause jurisprudence.210 My additional 
 
206 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
207 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1043-44 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting a DOJ decision not to defend a statute 
and staying litigation for forty-five days, to enable congressional intervention). 
208 See Letter from Andrew Fois, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sen. Orrin G. 
Hatch (Mar. 22, 1996), reprinted in 1 J.L. (1 PUB. L. MISC.) 19, 22-27 (2011), http://journaloflaw. 
us/0%20JoL/1-1/Jol1-1.pdf (listing the cases in which the DOJ declined to defend the constitution-
ality of a statute).  
209 Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-Executive-power-grab-
in-the-decision-not-to-defend-doma; see also Richard Epstein, Dumb on DOMA, RICOCHET (Feb. 
23, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Dumb-on-DOMA (“[T]he choice of the 
President to surrender unilaterally (which could have been anticipated from his earlier actions) 
makes it unclear whether any private party has standing to defend DOMA. . . . This action 
therefore could lead to a constitutional crisis of some significance.”). 
210 See Igor Volsky, Rick Perry Fails Govt 101: Claims Executive Orders Can Repeal Laws Passed 
by Congress, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 3, 2011, 9:08 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2011/12/03/ 
381485/rick-perry-failed-govt-101-claims-Executive-orders-can-repeal-laws-passed-by-congress (“Rick 
Perry repeatedly insisted that the President has the authority to block the implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act, despite a recent Congressional Research Service report finding to the 
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questions are uniquely solicitous toward nondefense decisions responding to 
the Carolene Products concerns discussed earlier,211 and serve as a constant 
reminder to the President that, by contrast, he should be hesitant to make 
nondefense decisions in other contexts. 
Similarly, would the consideration of whether to defend the constitu-
tionality of a statute result in a different decision under Dellinger’s frame-
work than under my framework, in either an equal protection or a non–
equal protection case? I offer three observations in light of the modifications 
I propose below. First, regardless of whether the President would make a 
different decision under Dellinger’s model than under my modifications, the 
modifications should influence the manner in which he carries out the 
decisionmaking process and its aftermath. For instance, while President 
Obama would likely have decided not to defend DOMA under either 
framework, my suggestions push the President toward the provision of 
more extensive justifications for his position, both in the courts and to the 
public. Second, as I discuss below in subsection III.B.3, my framework also 
helps to shed light on potential nondefense decisions outside the equal 
protection context. Finally, the additional value of my elaborated factors 
becomes clearer in Part IV, where I apply the model to President Obama’s 
decision not to defend DOMA. If nothing else, the suggestions I provide 
elaborate the decisional framework for a President who needs core princi-
ples to guide him in making his nondefense decision. 
2. The Modified Model 
Some guiding questions help to address the concerns discussed above. 
First, did Congress itself consider the constitutionality of the statute in 
question?212 If so, how does its analysis compare with one the Court might 
undertake, especially given changed circumstances? Next, is the President 
taking other actions, such as publicly advancing his reasoning, to make 
 
contrary.”); see also Kerr, supra note 209 (expressing concern that “the Executive Branch [will] 
essentially ha[ve] the power to decide what legislation it will defend based on whatever views of 
the Constitution are popular or associated with that Administration.”). Obviously, the Commerce 
Clause question in the Affordable Care Act case did not raise Carolene Products concerns. See Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2616-17 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (explaining that “we owe a large 
measure of respect to Congress when it frames and enacts economic and social legislation”). For 
more on the intersection of politics, policy, and law, see generally, for example, Paul D. Clement, 
The Intra-Executive Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 311, 317 (2009); Gorod, supra note 61, at 
1246; and Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1214. See also generally supra note 12. 
211 See supra Section III.A. 
212 Cf. Johnsen, supra note 49, at 35 (explaining that evidence of such consideration by Con-
gress should be relevant to the President’s enforcement decision). 
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nondefense effective and himself politically accountable? Additionally, have 
lower courts considered the constitutionality of the provision, and if so, 
how do their analyses impact the President’s evaluation of any changed 
circumstances? 
To address the foregoing questions, I propose the following new model 
for presidential nondefense of statutes. It begins, like the Dellinger/Johnsen 
model, with the understanding that the President will sometimes need to 
make his own interpretations under the Take Care Clause.213 Second, while 
the President should endeavor to correct unconstitutional provisions 
through the legislative process, he should also ask whether repeal would 
deprive the issue of judicial resolution.214 
Third, when considering the offending provision’s constitutionality, the 
President should employ a standard more searching than the Supreme 
Court’s rational basis standard. The focus here should be on examining 
what Congress did and thoroughly exploring why it did so—and whether 
the reasons proffered truly justify its objectives.215 At this point, the inquiry 
should not yet turn to which level of scrutiny the Court would or should 
apply—with all the baggage that a level of judicial scrutiny carries.216 Why 
not simply use the heightened scrutiny test? The President should move 
away—even if only a short distance—from the narrow confines of the 
Court’s three-tiered equal protection jurisprudence: the whole point of 
nondefense is that simply applying a certain tier of judicial scrutiny, in this 
case rational basis, will not always suffice. While the judgment regarding an 
 
213 See supra Section II.A; see also Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 523 (“[E]ven as Article 
II requires faithful execution of constitutional laws, it forbids the Executive from executing 
unconstitutional ones.” (footnote omitted)). 
214 The ramifications of this inquiry are outside the scope of this Comment. However, repeal 
of a discriminatory act will not necessarily end discrimination based on the same classification by 
either the federal government or state governments. Thus, I suggest that the President at least 
assess the added value in choosing not to defend an unconstitutional provision, rather than only 
seeking to have it repealed. 
215 Consider, for instance, the standard that the Court has adopted under the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” provision. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (“The 
reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”). In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the 
Court explained that when a plaintiff challenges an agency’s regulation under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the agency has the burden of justifying its rule based on the actual reasons it 
considered in deciding to adopt the rule—the agency’s actual contemporaneous rationality. 463 
U.S. 29, 42-44, 43 n.9, 50 (1983). Whereas under rational basis review, Congress might be able to 
adduce reasons to support its decision after the fact, an agency bears the burden of demonstrating 
that its actual reasoning, contemporaneous with its decision, supports that decision. Id. at 50. 
216  See supra notes 130 & 131 and accompanying text. 
  
338 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 291 
 
offending provision’s constitutionality is ultimately a legal one, some judges 
and Justices may not yet understand why a different tier should apply.217 
Thus, I would instead incorporate simple actual contemporaneous ration-
ality review into the President’s nondefense decisionmaking framework. I 
would clarify that it must not be “toothless,”218 and it should be adjusted 
upward where the equal protection considerations of immutability and 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities”219 suggest that some form 
of heightened scrutiny is appropriate. In calibrating his own scrutiny level, 
the President should consider whether individuals in the group Congress 
has classified have been “subjected to discrimination,” whether they “exhibit 
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a 
discrete group,” and whether they are “a minority or politically power-
less.”220 Even where these criteria are less than fully fulfilled, the President 
should act on the basis that objectives such as “‘a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group’ are not legitimate state interests,” nor are 
“mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are 
properly cognizable.”221 These considerations will allow him to better assess 
the Carolene Products concerns discussed above.222 
To the assessment of these factors, the President should bring his insti-
tutional factfinding capacity to bear. He should ask whether circumstances 
have changed and examine shifts in social indicators and lower court 
interpretations (and the Supreme Court’s interpretations, even if they are 
simply suggestive), as well as assess the magnitude of the ongoing harm 
caused by the offending provision. The contemporaneousness component of 
this standard would ensure that the President explored any animosity on 
the part of Congress that might have infected the statute and that the 
 
217 Cf. Conversation with Walter Dellinger, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers LLP ( July 13, 
2012) (questioning why the executive branch should be bound by the way that courts think about 
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection). 
218 See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (qualifying the rational basis standard). 
219 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[R]ace, like gender and illegitimacy, 
is an immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside. . . . ‘[L]egal 
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing,’ and . . . 
advancement sanctioned, sponsored, or approved by the State should ideally be based on 
individual merit or achievement, or at the least on factors within the control of an individual.” 
(citations omitted)). 
220 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 
(1986)). 
221 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447, 448 (1985) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). 
222 See supra Section III.A. 
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justifications proffered for the provision were consistent with changing 
notions of equality. In other words, the President should ask what actually 
motivated Congress at the time it passed the offending statute, in addition 
to whatever reasonable arguments might support the statute after the fact. 
This point is consistent with the fourth point, that while the President 
should consider what the Court would do, he should ask the question less 
with a predictive tenor, and more with a normative strategic thrust. 
Nondefense is an opportunity for the President to assert his better view of 
the offending provision’s constitutionality (i.e., better than the judgment he 
predicts the Court will make), with the intention of persuading the Court to 
adopt that view. Thus, even if there might be nonfrivolous rational basis 
arguments supporting the constitutionality of the offending statute, the 
DOJ need not raise them if the President believes that heightened scrutiny 
should apply—he need not undermine his argument that a more searching 
standard is required by arguing, essentially, in the alternative.223 
Fifth, he should continue to seek judicial review of the issue by instruct-
ing the DOJ to flesh out his nondefense arguments in litigation, appealing 
district or appellate rulings (even those agreeing with his arguments),224 
producing a publicly available advisory opinion, and taking his case to the 
court of public opinion. 
In combination, these considerations will provide the President with 
more robust guidance when he makes his nondefense decision and should, 
in turn, lead him to the right result more often. 
3. Nondefense Decisions Outside the Equal Protection Context 
As a practical matter, the President has little reason to be personally 
concerned with deciding whether to enforce or defend every allegedly 
unconstitutional statute on the books during his administration. The 
Dellinger/Johnsen framework relies, to a large degree, on there being few 
 
223 But see Conversation with Walter Dellinger, supra note 217. Dellinger points out that, 
with the Holder Letter, the DOJ had not flatly refused to defend DOMA, nor should it have; the 
DOJ could simultaneously take the position that heightened scrutiny is the right standard and 
DOMA cannot survive it, but that it would defend it under rational basis scrutiny. Id.; see also 
Holder Letter, supra note 2 (“If asked by the district courts in the Second Circuit for the position of 
the United States in the event those courts determine that the applicable standard is rational basis, 
the Department will state that, consistent with the position it has taken in prior cases, a reasonable 
argument for Section 3’s constitutionality may be proffered under that permissive standard.”). 
224 The DOJ should be able to appeal a loss even if it agrees with the plaintiff. See INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983) (“[T]he INS’s agreement with the Court of Appeals’ decision 
that [the statute] is unconstitutional does not affect that agency’s ‘aggrieved’ status for purposes of 
appealing that decision.”). 
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statutes that will clearly present significant and serious constitutional 
questions. This subsection briefly addresses what a President might do 
when there is a very strong argument that a statute is facially unconstitu-
tional for reasons other than violation of equal protection principles. 
The case of United States v. Alvarez225 serves as a hypothetical for how 
this framework could work in the First Amendment context. There, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed the facial constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), 
which made it a crime for a person to “falsely represent[] himself or herself, 
verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal 
authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States.”226 The 
court observed that “Alvarez was not prosecuted for impersonating a 
military officer, or lying under oath, or making false statements in order to 
unlawfully obtain benefits. There was not even a requirement the govern-
ment prove he intended to mislead. He was prosecuted simply for saying 
something that was not true.”227 Because lying, without more, does not fit 
into one of the few categories of speech excepted from First Amendment 
protection, and because § 704(b) did not otherwise pass strict scrutiny, the 
Ninth Circuit struck down the provision as facially unconstitutional.228 
The President instructed neither the DOJ nor the Solicitor General not 
to defend the statute. Nonetheless, the constitutional infirmity of § 704(b) 
seemed fairly clear. Under the rigorous First Amendment jurisprudence, 
“[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden 
of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”229 When the government’s 
restriction is content-based, the government must either show that the 
speech in question fits into “a few limited,” narrow, and well-defined 
historical categories, or that the regulation passes strict scrutiny.230 Outside 
the context of false commercial speech, lies, in and of themselves, have 
never been one of these categories, and the Court has been extremely 
 
225 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) (Alvarez I), reh’g en banc denied, 638 F.3d 666 (2011) (Alvarez 
II), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (Alvarez III). 
226 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006), declared unconstitutional by Alvarez III, 132 S. Ct. 2537. 
227 Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1218. 
228 Id. The Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc. See Alvarez II, 638 F.3d 666. 
Chief Judge Kozinski explained, “Without the robust protection of the First Amendment, the 
white lies, exaggeration and deception that are an integral part of human intercourse would 
become targets of censorship, subject only to the rubber stamp known as “rational basis review.” Id. 
at 673 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added). 
229 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000). 
230 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733-34 (2011). 
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resistant to recognizing any previously unrecognized categories.231 Since 
§ 704(b) did not fit any such categories, the question seemed to become 
whether it passed strict scrutiny, and “[i]t is rare that a regulation restrict-
ing speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”232 In Alvarez, the 
Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed any such argument that § 704(b) would 
pass strict scrutiny.233 
If President Obama had applied Dellinger’s framework, he might have 
asked what the Court was likely to do. He would have been on strong 
footing, supported by an appellate decision, despite another to the contrary,234 
in asserting that § 704(b) was unconstitutional. He might thus have refused 
to defend § 704(b). Of course, recognizing his role as Commander-in-Chief, 
and the harmful nature, to veterans, of lies about military medals, the Presi-
dent also might have continued to defend the statute (and indeed he did). 
Yet suppose hypothetically that President Obama was concerned about 
§ 704(b)’s constitutionality. Under my framework—even when applied 
outside of the equal protection context—the President would have made 
further inquiries that would have made him less likely to refuse to defend the 
statute. He would have asked about Congress’s actual contemporaneous 
rationality, and found that Congress both made formal findings235 and 
debated the merits of the statute.236 These very sources could have helped 
the President determine what Congress intended and whether the intent 
was consistent with First Amendment standards. The President could have 
brought his institutional capacities as Commander-in-Chief to bear on these 
questions and ask what effect the provision would have had on the military, 
much as Clinton did in the context of HIV-positive individuals.237 And the 
President would have found no indicia of the Carolene Products problem—
i.e., the tyranny of the majority over a minority, and especially not a 
minority with an immutable condition. Rather, he would have seen that 
 
231 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (“Our [previous] decisions . . . 
cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech 
outside the scope of the First Amendment.”). 
232 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). 
233 Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1216 (“Even the dissent agrees that the Act fails strict scrutiny.”). 
234 United States v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2012) (upholding § 704(b) 
under so-called breathing space review), abrogated by Alvarez III, 132 S. Ct. 2537. 
235 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266. 
236 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. 22,575 (2006) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.); id. at 
22,575 (statement of Rep. John Kline); id. at 22,574-75 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner); 
151 CONG. REC. 12,688-89 (2005) (statement of Sen. Kent Conrad).  
237 See supra notes 60 & 165 and accompanying text. 
  
342 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 291 
 
Congress had documented that the government in fact had arguably 
compelling interests at least rationally related to § 704(b).238 
The President would then have asked what the Court would do and 
would have sought to ensure that there was judicial review. Here, because 
of the stringent standards applied to content-based regulations in the First 
Amendment context, the President would have had reason to believe that 
the Court might in fact strike down § 704(b) without any need for him to 
suggest that it do so, even if, after the foregoing inquiry, he had come to the 
conclusion that the law ought to fall. And indeed, a plurality of the Court 
did strike down § 704(b), after noting that “[t]he Government has not 
demonstrated that false statements generally should constitute a new 
category of unprotected speech,” and that “[t]he lack of a causal link 
between the Government’s stated interest and the Act” shows that “the Act 
is not actually necessary to achieve the Government’s stated interest.”239 
*      *      * 
In short, even a First Amendment issue, especially one of limited scope, 
does not necessarily raise the types of concerns discussed earlier in this 
Part—in particular, tyranny of the majority and the risk that the Court may 
apply too deferential a standard. My gloss on the nondefense decisionmaking 
framework helps to serve as a limiting principle for future nondefense 
decisions. 
IV. APPLYING THE NEW MODEL TO PRESIDENT  
OBAMA’S NONDEFENSE OF DOMA 
I now apply this model—albeit after the fact—to President Obama’s 
decision to instruct the Department of Justice not to defend the Defense of 
Marriage Act. Note that, while this application requires some consideration 
of the merits of heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sexual 
orientation, the two inquiries are not the same. Here, the discussion focuses 
on the decisionmaking process itself.240 
 
238 Strandlof, 667 F.3d at 1168-69 (“[T]he government has an important—perhaps compel-
ling—interest in preventing individuals from falsely claiming to have received military awards.”). 
239 Alvarez III, 132 S. Ct. at 2547-49 (plurality opinion). 
240  For arguments that sexual orientation should receive heightened scrutiny, see Supersed-
ing Brief for Appellant at 21-22, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207 & 10-2214); Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in 
Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss at 8-
27, Pederson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 2012 WL 3113883 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012) (No. 10-1750) 
[hereinafter DOJ’s Pederson Brief]; Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss at 3-18, 
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At this point, one might again reasonably ask what my five-step model 
adds to the Dellinger/Johnsen framework. My model demands an extensive 
inquiry into the merits of both positions—that the statute is constitutional 
or that it is unconstitutional. The actual contemporaneous rationality 
standard ensures as much, because it cuts both ways. But it is also slightly 
less deferential to Congress and the Judiciary than Dellinger’s model, which 
asks primarily how the Court would resolve the issue. Of course, we do not 
know what the Court will say about DOMA; the result could, but need not, 
turn on the difference between rational basis review and heightened 
scrutiny. But my modifications increase the likelihood that, in situations 
like the decision not to defend DOMA, the President will not merely 
cursorily state that the act is unconstitutional—as Clinton did when 
refusing to enforce the HIV provision241—but will instead provide substan-
tial guidance to explain the decision to the public, as well as influencing, 
rather than merely predicting, the Court’s outcome. 
This democratic demand for transparency is valuable. And, as the fol-
lowing discussion makes clear, in addition to the Holder Letter, the DOJ 
has provided extensive guidance to the Court and the public that explains 
why DOMA should be judged under heightened scrutiny and be found 
unconstitutional on that basis. Finally, my model suggests just how distinct 
equal protection violations are, and it suggests the importance of looking 
into and openly addressing the particular constitutional value at issue. 
In this Part, I will show that President Obama’s decision not to defend 
DOMA comports with the five-step model proposed above. Obama 
assessed the suggested criteria and ultimately reached a decision where he is 
prepared to defer—in the final judgment—to the Judiciary. I first address 
Obama’s consideration of the Take Care Clause and repeal efforts. Then, I 
discuss how Obama and the DOJ evaluated the constitutionality of the statute 
and considered Congress’s actual contemporaneous rationality, changes in 
circumstances, whether the law had changed, and the magnitude of the 
ongoing harm. Finally, I explore how the DOJ has sought—and sought to 
influence—judicial review—thereby respecting the separation of powers. 
 
Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 10-0257) [hereinafter 
DOJ’s Golinski Brief]. For an appellate holding to this effect, see infra notes 353-59 and accompa-
nying text. 
241 See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 227, 227 (Feb. 10, 1996) (“I have concluded that this discriminatory provision is 
unconstitutional. Specifically, it violates equal protection by requiring the discharge of qualified 
service members living with HIV who are medically able to serve, without furthering any 
legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
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A. The Take Care Clause and Repeal Efforts 
President Obama has considered his role and responsibilities under the 
Take Care Clause. The Holder Letter acknowledges “the Executive’s 
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, unless and until 
Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict 
against the law’s constitutionality.”242 First, Attorney General Holder 
clearly explains that the President has found a middle ground by instructing 
him to enforce, but not to defend, DOMA.243 Second, President Obama 
also supports the Respect for Marriage Act, which would repeal DOMA,244 
and his instrumental efforts in the repeal of the military’s “don’t ask, don’t 
tell” policy show his support to be more than mere rhetoric.245 President 
Obama is thus simultaneously pursuing both nondefense and repeal 
strategies, while recognizing the reality that, in today’s Senate, the filibuster 
means slim chances of repeal.246  
B. Evaluating the Statute’s Constitutionality 
In this Section, I show that Obama’s considerations complied with my 
modified model. I first analyze whether Obama and the DOJ considered 
Congress’s actual contemporaneous rationality behind DOMA. Then, I 
address their consideration of changed circumstances and law, as well as the 
magnitude of the ongoing harm. 
1. Actual Contemporaneous Rationality 
If the Holder Letter is any indication, President Obama took this crite-
rion to its logical conclusion. Holder describes looking to DOMA’s 
legislative history and finding the House Report247 rife with “moral 
 
242 See Holder Letter, supra note 2. 
243 Id. 
244 See S. 598, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011) (defining an individual as married under federal law if 
the individual’s marriage is valid under the laws of any state); see also H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. § 3 
(2011) (same); Colleen Curtis, President Obama Supports the Respect for Marriage Act, WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG ( July 19, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ blog/2011/07/19/President-
obama-supports-respect-marriage-act (announcing President Obama’s support for the Respect for 
Marriage Act). 
245 See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515; Jesse 
Lee, The President Signs Repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”: “Out of Many, We Are One”, WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:35 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/12/22/President-
signs-repeal-dont-ask-dont-tell-out-many-we-are-one. 
246 See OLESZEK, supra note 186, at 272 (discussing the need for sixty votes given the fre-
quent use of the filibuster). 
247 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664 (1996) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
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disapproval of gays and lesbians and their intimate and family relation-
ships—precisely the kind of stereotype-based thinking and animus the 
Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard against.”248 
Holder’s characterization could not be more accurate: brimming with 
the language of attack, assault, combat, war, and threats, the House Report 
literally casts gay men and lesbians as the enemy and leaves little doubt as 
to the how the Act’s name was selected.249 One of DOMA’s two stated 
purposes “is to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage” 
because “[t]he prospect of permitting homosexual couples to ‘marry’ . . .  
threatens to have very real consequences.”250 By its own admission, Congress 
was reacting to its incomprehension of Romer v. Evans,251 decided just one 
month earlier, in which the Court held that a Colorado constitutional 
amendment (Amendment 2) prohibiting government action designed to 
protect homosexuals from discrimination violated the Equal Protection 
Clause (under the rational basis standard) since it “raise[d] the inevitable 
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the 
class of persons affected.”252 Congress seized on Justice Scalia’s rhetoric; he 
had declared that “[t]he Court ha[d] mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of 
spite.”253 In the Report, Congress itself declared war against the “orches-
trated legal assault being waged” as part of a campaign “on religious, 
cultural, and legal fronts” to secure gay marriage in the states.254 The report 
cast DOMA as “a modest effort to combat” the threat of gay marriage and 
declared that the time had come “to take sides in this culture war.”255 And as 
with every war, the doves—here, the bill’s detractors—argued that the 
hawks had no “factual basis” for declaring gay marriage a threat but had 
instead “use[d] ignorance as an excuse for haste” by failing to hold hearings 
to investigate the evidence.256 
Against this backdrop, Obama and the DOJ asked whether the drafters 
of the House Report had considered DOMA’s constitutionality under the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The answer they found 
was, only perfunctorily. Unabashedly unable to make sense of Romer, the 
 
248 Holder Letter, supra note 2. 
249 See id. n.7 (collecting examples). 
250 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 2 (emphasis added). 
251 See id. at 32 (“Romer is, to put it charitably, an elusive decision.”). 
252 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
253 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
254 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 2-3. 
255 Id. at 12 (emphasis added) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
256 Id. at 42 (dissenting views) (“The notion that allowing two people who are in love to 
become legally responsible to and for each other threatens heterosexual marriage is without factual 
basis.”). 
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drafters had nonetheless lambasted the Romer Court for foregoing “even a 
cursory analysis of the interests Amendment 2 might serve.”257 To Congress, 
sitting as a supercourt accusing the Supreme Court of sitting as a superlegisla-
ture, “it [was] inconceivable how Amendment 2 could fail to meet the rational 
basis test.”258 “[N]othing, in the Court’s recent decision,” they concluded, 
“suggests that the Defense of Marriage Act is constitutionally suspect.”259 
The drafters proceeded to present the four government interests that 
DOMA would advance260 while eliding the notion that the legislative 
classifications must be rationally related to those interests.261 What Holder 
must have seen in the legislative history—and what the drafters, ostensibly, 
did and could not—was that DOMA was “born of animosity.”262 First, the 
drafters asserted, the government had an “interest in defending and 
nurturing the institution of traditional, heterosexual marriage” to promote 
procreation and child-rearing.263 Holder dispelled this notion as “unreason-
able” against the weight of “numerous studies,”264 and he might also have 
cited Perry v. Schwarzenegger’s extensive findings of fact that children fare 
no better in straight rather than gay households.265 Holder again stacked the 
weight of modern science266 against the drafters’ claim that sexual orienta-
tion is mutable.267 
Second, the drafters claimed that DOMA “advances the government’s 
interest in defending traditional notions of morality”—“traditional (espe-
cially Judeo-Christian) morality.”268 Holder aptly addressed this contention, 
too, by declaring it “precisely the kind of stereotype-based thinking and 
 
257 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 32. 
258 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The drafters argued it was “inconceivable” be-
cause, in their eyes, Amendment 2 safeguarded “the freedom of association,” and “it is self-evident 
that protecting that freedom is a legitimate government purpose.” Id. 
259 Id. at 33. 
260 Id. at 12. 
261 See id. at 33 (“[T]he Defense of Marriage Act is also plainly constitutional under Romer. 
The Committee briefly described above at least four legitimate government interests that are 
advanced by this legislation—namely, defending the institution of traditional heterosexual 
marriage; defending traditional notions of morality; protecting state sovereignty and democratic 
self-governance; and preserving government resources. The Committee is satisfied that these 
interests amply justify the enactment of this bill.”). 
262 See id. at 32 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)). 
263 Id. at 12-13. 
264 Holder Letter, supra note 2. 
265 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
266 See Holder Letter, supra note 2 (explaining that claims that sexual orientation is mutable 
“can[not] be reconciled with more recent social science understandings” and citing studies). 
267 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 15 n.53 (“Maintaining a preferred societal status 
of heterosexual marriage thus will also serve to encourage heterosexuality . . . .”). 
268 Id. at 15-16. 
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animus the Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard against.”269 Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment in Lawrence v. Texas provides 
additional support for Holder’s stance. She explained that “[m]oral disap-
proval . . . , like a bare desire to harm [a] group, is an interest that is 
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”270 
Third, the drafters asserted that DOMA “advances the government’s 
interest in protecting state sovereignty and democratic self-governance” by 
taking the matter away from the courts.271 As a logical proposition, this 
rationale is no better than the one often advanced to support court-
stripping. It is both tautological and orthogonal to the rational basis 
analysis. It asserts, “We have a legitimate interest in this law because we 
agreed to pass it by majority vote”—a factor wholly irrelevant to (and, 
indeed, often at odds with) constitutionality. 
Fourth and finally, the drafters asserted that DOMA “advances the gov-
ernment’s interest in preserving scarce government resources.”272 Even 
under the rational basis standard, however, the animus, moral disapproval, 
and prejudice behind DOMA are clear, so the inquiry becomes not whether 
saving money is a legitimate end, but whether the discriminatory classifica-
tion Congress has chosen is a permissible means of tightening the fisc.273 
Finally, the drafters’ failure to respond to the dissenting views’ due 
 
269  Holder Letter, supra note 2. 
270 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). For support, Justice 
O’Connor cited United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), in which the 
Court explained that “if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means 
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest” in striking down a law 
determined to be merely a vehicle to harm “hippies.” Id. at 534. 
271 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 16; see also An Examination of the Constitutional 
Amendment on Marriage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Property 
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) (statement of Professor Christopher 
Wolfe) (“[G]iven the existence of a well-organized and financed effort to legalize same-sex 
marriage in this country, backed by extensive ideological scholarship in the academy and in the 
legal community, it is only prudent to remove even the possibility that judges will intervene to 
strike down the Defense of Marriage Act and the State laws it was intended to protect.”). 
272 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 18. 
273 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]here the distinction is drawn against a historically disadvantaged group and has no other 
basis [than saving the government money], Supreme Court precedent marks this as a reason 
undermining rather than bolstering the distinction.” (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 
(1982))); cf. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (“The question is not whether such saving is a 
legitimate purpose but whether the State may accomplish that end by the discriminatory means it 
has chosen.”). 
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process274 and heightened scrutiny concerns275 only reinforces the poverty of 
their actual contemporaneous constitutional assessment.276 
2. Have Circumstances Changed? 
As President, Obama has also been uniquely positioned to take stock of 
social indicators, many of which point to the conclusion that heightened 
scrutiny should apply to classifications based on sexual orientation. To 
begin, as the Holder Letter observes, sexual orientation is immutable;277 
there is a growing consensus on this point.278 Immutability satisfies one 
criterion of the heightened scrutiny analysis.279 Social indicators of prejudice 
satisfy another.280 Far from supporting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, polls show that popular opinion is shifting towards “seeing gay 
and lesbian relations as morally acceptable”; support for same-sex marriage 
“is near record highs.”281 Overall, the last few years have revealed a compel-
 
274 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 40 (dissenting views) (noting that the right to 
marry is constitutionally protected (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978))). 
275 See id. (“If an argument can be persuasive that the anti same sex marriage statute is dis-
crimination based on gender, it may well receive intermediate scrutiny. . . . For strict scrutiny, the 
court would have to . . . elevate classifications based on homosexuality to that of strict scrutiny, a 
level which may be due . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
276 There are parallels in the DOJ’s argument that multiple lower courts have failed to ade-
quately consider the argument for heightened scrutiny over rational basis in evaluating DOMA. 
See infra notes 353-372 and accompanying text. 
277 See Holder Letter, supra note 2. 
278 See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 98-108 (1992) (discussing “the biology of 
‘deviant’ sex”). As early as 1992, Judge Posner translated this consensus into legal terms: “[T]o 
discriminate . . . against persons on the basis of their sexual preference . . . is particularly suspect 
because sexual preference is a largely immutable characteristic and therefore analogous to sex and 
race, which under the jurisprudence of equal protection are—race especially—highly disfavored 
grounds of discrimination.” Id. at 348 (citations omitted); see also Barbara L. Frankowski, Sexual 
Orientation and Adolescents, 113 PEDIATRICS 1827, 1828 (2004) (“[T]he current literature and most 
scholars in the field state that one’s sexual orientation is not a choice; that is, individuals do not 
choose to be homosexual or heterosexual.”); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 161-65 (2011) (discussing shifting definitions of immutability and the 
disagreement among lower courts regarding whether sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic). 
279 For factors relevant to the Court’s determination of whether a classification should re-
ceive heightened scrutiny, see Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) and Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 
U.S. 587, 602 (1987). See also Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638 (considering, “[a]s a historical matter,” whether 
a particular class has “been subjected to discrimination”; exhibits “obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristics that define [it] as a discrete group”; and is “a minority or politically 
powerless.”); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and 
the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 504 (1998) (“[T]reating people differently 
because of traits they cannot change violates fundamental norms of fairness and equality.”). 
280 See supra note 279. 
281 See Lydia Saad, Americans’ Acceptance of Gay Relations Crosses 50% Threshold, GALLUP 
(May 25, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/135764/Americans-Acceptance-Gay-Relations-Crosses-
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ling trend toward societal acceptance of gays and lesbians.282 Moreover, as 
much as Justice Scalia would claim that these changing social “mores” prove 
that the lesbian and gay community is “a politically powerful minority”283 
that has gotten the Court to “sign[] on to [its] so-called homosexual 
agenda,”284 as Holder points out, (1) discrimination in the military and 
employment demonstrate the political-legal reality for sexual-orientation 
minorities, and (2) political powerlessness is not a prerequisite to the 
application of heightened scrutiny, as the extension of heightened scrutiny 
to sex-based classifications illustrates.285 
In fact, the taint of sexual orientation discrimination affects lesbian- and 
gay-identified individuals in all sectors of our society, even if one leaves the 
issue of widespread marriage inequality to one side.286 Bigotry born  
in schools287—where a full 90% of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or 
transgender–identified youth experience bullying or harassment, more than 
half feel unsafe,288 and some respond with suicide,289—spreads to places of 
 
Threshold.aspx; see also, e.g., Kate Zernike, Conservatives’ Focus on Fiscal Matters Means Few Care 
About a Gay Republican, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at A9 (“In a New York Times/CBS News poll 
conducted in March 2004, a plurality of Americans under 45—35 percent—said there should be no 
legal recognition of gay and lesbian relationships. Forty-five percent of Americans 45 and older 
said the same. By April 2010, just 24 percent of Americans ages 18 to 44 surveyed said that there 
should be no legal recognition, and 35 percent of Americans 45 and older said the same.”). 
282 See, e.g., Charles M. Blow, Gay? Whatever, Dude, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010, at A21 (de-
scribing society’s increasingly accepting views of gays and lesbians). 
283 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
284 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
285 Holder Letter, supra note 2 (“[W]hen the Court ruled that gender-based classifications 
were subject to heightened scrutiny, women already had won major political victories such as the 
Nineteenth Amendment (right to vote) and protection under Title VII (employment discrimina-
tion).”). 
286 Twenty-nine states constitutionally define marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman, and twelve bar the state from recognizing same-sex marriage. See John Schwartz, After 
New York, New Look at Defense of Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A12. 
287 In 2008–2009, for instance, the New York public school system reported nearly 900 
incidents of harassment based on sexual orientation. Al Baker, Bratton’s Law-and-Order Appeal for 
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011, 6:29 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/03/31/brattons-law-and-order-appeal-for-same-sex-marriage.  
288 JOSEPH G. KOSCIW ET AL., GAY, LESBIAN & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, THE 2009 
NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS 25-29 (2010) (surveying all types of 
harassment, from cyberbullying to physical assault). See generally STUART BIEGEL & SHEILA 
JAMES KUEHL, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAFE AT SCHOOL: ADDRESSING THE SCHOOL 
ENVIRONMENT AND LGBT SAFETY THROUGH POLICY AND LEGISLATION (2010), available at 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Biegel-Kuehl-Safe-At-School-Oct-2011.pdf 
(making similar findings, and proposing model legislation). 
289 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S1557 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2011) (statement of Sen. Franken) 
(“Justin was a kind young man, friendly and cheerful, a budding composer, but he was also the 
target for bullies at his high school, who targeted him because he was different—because he was 
  
350 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 291 
 
employment290 and the private housing market.291 In addition, same-sex 
spouses are frequently denied visiting rights at hospitals292 and face further 
unequal treatment under the law with respect to jointly held property,293 
estate294 and income tax,295 entitlements and military benefits,296 and 
immigration.297 
Holder succinctly and effectively disputed that gay men and women are 
a politically powerful group.298 He could have elaborated, however, for 
viewing gay men and women as a politically powerful minority conflates 
effort with outcome. While they have filed a number of lawsuits,299 they had 
 
gay. . . . His family lost him to suicide last summer. . . . [U]nfortunately, there are a lot of other 
kids out there struggling to get through school as they suffer from bullying and harassment and 
discrimination at their public schools. . . . This harassment deprives them of an equal education.”). 
290 For examples of a host of lawsuits brought alleging sexual orientation discrimination in 
employment, see 2 L. CAMILLE HÉBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 9:12 & n.3 (2012) . 
291 See Press Release, John Kerry—U.S. Senator for Massachusetts: Press Room, Kerry 
Legislation Would Outlaw LGBT Discrimination in Housing, Credit (Sept. 22, 2011), available at 
http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=751ff93c-d922-4f6b-887e-90920819fc13 (“Still today, prejudiced 
landlords are discriminating against LGBT and other innocent tenants—and these tenants often 
have no recourse in states without LGBT protections.”). 
292 See Tara Parker-Pope, In Sickness and in Health, Regardless of Gender, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
2010, at D5 (noting the frequency of same-sex partners denied full visitation rights to see a partner 
or adopted child). 
293 See, e.g., Scott James, An Unlikely Plaintiff. At Issue? He Dares Not Speak Its Name., N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A19A (recounting the plight of a plaintiff who lost his partner and was 
unable to hold on to their cats and shared belongings). 
294 See John Schwartz, Gay Couples Begin Attack on U.S. Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2010, at A20 (discussing how special rules for estate taxes apply to same-sex couples). 
295 See, e.g., Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Same-Sex Couples, IRS (Aug. 4, 2012), 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Answers-to-Frequently-Asked-Questions-for-Same-Sex-Couples (“Same-sex 
partners may not file using a married filing separately or jointly filing status because federal law 
does not treat same-sex partners as married for federal tax purposes.”). 
296 E.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Marriage Law Is Challenged as Equaling Discrimination, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A16 (describing how a longtime postal worker challenged the Defense of 
Marriage Act as unconstitutional because he was not afforded the same health benefits for his 
spouse as were his married heterosexual co-workers). 
297 See Associated Press, National Briefing: New England; Massachusetts: Husbands Reunited, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010, at A14 (describing how a Brazilian man needed the assistance of Senator 
John Kerry to gain admittance to the country in his effort to reunite with his husband). 
298 See Holder Letter, supra note 2 (“[T]he adoption of laws like those at issue in Romer v. 
Evans and Lawrence, the longstanding ban on gays and lesbians in the military, and the absence of 
federal protection for employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation show the 
group to have limited political power . . . .”). 
299 E.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (considering a 
challenge to California’s Proposition 8), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 
2012); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (considering a challenge 
to DOMA), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st 
Cir. 2012). 
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received few favorable appellate holdings;300 the Ninth Circuit’s narrow 
ruling in Perry v. Brown was handed down on February 7, 2012, nearly a year 
after Holder issued his letter,301 and only recently did the Second Circuit 
strike DOMA down under heightened scrutiny.302 For instance, even a 
cursory survey of Title VII suits alleging employment discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation reveals the breadth and depth of societal animosi-
ty towards gay men and women.303 
The bottom line is that “Congress has not yet seen fit . . . to provide 
protection against such harassment.”304 While the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, which would allow disparate treatment and retaliation 
claims for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,305 passed  
the House in 2007306 and met with President Obama’s support,307 the bill  
 
300 E.g., In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he application of DOMA . . . 
so as to deny Levenson’s request that his same-sex spouse receive federal benefits violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
301 See 671 F.3d at 1096 (holding that California’s Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
302 See Windsor v. United States, Nos. 12-2335 & 12-2435, 2012 WL 4937310, at *10-13 (2d Cir. 
Oct. 18, 2012). 
303 See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 760 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff Vick-
ers allegedly left his job because coworkers terrorized him for openly associating with a gay doctor: 
in addition to placing chemicals in his food and on his property, “Vickers’ co-workers repeatedly 
touched his crotch with a tape measure, grabbed Vickers’ chest while making derogatory 
comments, tried to shove a sanitary napkin in Vickers’ face, and simulated sex with a stuffed 
animal and then tried to push the stuffed animal into Vickers’ crotch.” Id. at 760. Despite these 
vivid accusations, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit. It held that 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not “encompass sexual orientation as a prohibited 
basis for discrimination.” Id. at 764.  
Other circuits agree that Congress has provided no statutory remedy, despite consensus that 
harassment on the basis of sexual orientation is intolerable. E.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 
35 (2d Cir. 2000) (declaring such harassment “morally reprehensible whenever and in whatever 
context it occurs, particularly in the modern workplace,” but finding for the defendant); Higgins 
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (describing harassment on 
the basis of sexual orientation as “a noxious practice, deserving of censure and opprobrium,” but 
finding for the defendant). Moreover, some courts have even flirted with disqualifying plaintiffs 
who otherwise have valid Title VII sex-stereotyping cases, simply because they were gay. See, e.g., 
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] gender stereotyping claim 
should not be used to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.” (quoting 
Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38) (internal citations omitted)). Only in Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc. 
did an appellate court expressly hold otherwise. See 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009) (“There is no 
basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion that an effeminate heterosexual man can 
bring a gender stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not.”); see also 
HÉBERT, supra note 290, § 9:12 & n.3 (collecting cases). 
304 Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001). 
305 S. 811, 112th Cong. §§ 4–5 (2011); see also H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. §§ 4–5 (2011). 
306 David M. Herszenhorn, House Backs Broad Protections for Gay Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
8, 2007, at A1. 
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languishes yet again in committee.308 Whatever animates congressional 
opposition to same-sex marriage, it is hard to fathom why members of 
Congress withhold support from bills that narrowly aim to address animosity 
toward gay men and women. Surely, Obama must have made the “inevita-
ble inference” that congressional inaction “is born of animosity toward the 
class of persons affected.”309 
Just as importantly, President Obama must have taken stock of the sup-
port he could count on following his nondefense decision. Before the 
Holder Letter, lawsuits,310 high-profile figures’ coming out,311 and political 
heavyweights speaking up during New York’s push for marriage equality312 
all lent support to Obama’s decision. To further bolster his stance, Obama 
could have publicly pointed to Washington, D.C.’s becoming, in 2010, the 
sixth jurisdiction in the United States to allow same-sex marriage.313 In 
addition, a prominent law firm, King & Spalding, withdrew from representing 
Congress in its defense of DOMA.314 Holder summarized the change in 
momentum: “[T]here is a growing acknowledgement that sexual orientation 
‘bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.’”315 
3. Has the Law Changed? 
President Obama’s inquiry responded to shifts in the courts in the years 
between the passage of DOMA and his nondefense decision. Before 
Congress voted on DOMA, one of President Clinton’s Assistant Attorneys 
 
307 See Civil Rights, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/civil-rights (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2012). 
308 See Thomas, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php (click “bill 
number”; enter “S. 811” in textbox; click “search” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
309 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).  
310 See, e.g., supra note 290. 
311 E.g., Michael Luo, Former Republican Leader Discloses That He Is Gay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
26, 2010, at A16 (reporting that President George W. Bush’s former campaign manager revealed 
that he is gay). 
312 See Michael Barbaro, New Ads to Try to Build Public Support for Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 2010, at A22 (describing videos with celebrities such as Julianne Moore, Kyra Sedgwick, 
Michael Bloomberg, and the Rev. Al Sharpton). Former President George W. Bush’s daughter 
also made one such video. See Michael Barbaro, Daughter of Bush Endorses Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, at A14. 
313 Ian Urbina, Nation’s Capital Joins 5 States in Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 4, 2010, at A20.  
314 Victor Li, King & Spalding Quits DOMA Case, Paul Clement Quits King & Spalding,  
AMLAW DAILY (Apr. 25, 2011, 3:26 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/04/  
domakandsclement.html (“The move comes after King & Spalding faced severe backlash and 
criticism over its decision to represent the U.S. House.”). 
315 See Holder Letter, supra note 2 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) 
(plurality opinion)). 
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General asserted rather flatly that the DOJ believed DOMA “would be 
sustained as constitutional” since it presented “no legal issues.”316 But by the 
time President Obama made the decision to stop defending DOMA, at least 
two federal courts had found it unconstitutional. In Gill v. Office of Personnel 
Management, a federal district court in Massachusetts held that, “even under 
the highly deferential rational basis test,” DOMA is unconstitutional.317 The 
Gill court dismissed all four objectives Congress asserted in the House 
Report,318 and the First Circuit has since affirmed the district court’s 
judgment (although only under rational basis review).319 And in the Ninth 
Circuit, Judge Reinhardt had earlier determined that DOMA’s restriction 
of federal benefits the plaintiff would otherwise have been entitled to under 
the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act was unconstitutional under the 
rational basis standard, even though he “believe[d] it likely that some form 
of heightened constitutional scrutiny applies.”320 Just days before Holder 
sent his letter, at least one other court seemed to be moving in the same 
direction.321 
In addition, President Obama must have reasonably believed that the 
Supreme Court will likely be at least somewhat receptive to Holder’s 
nondefense argument. The Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas 
struck down a Texas sodomy law criminalizing intimate same-sex conduct as 
violative of the liberty that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment safeguards.322 In her concurrence in the judgment, Justice 
O’Connor wrote that she would have relied instead on the Equal Protection 
 
316 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 34 (letter of Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois). 
317 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). In the companion case to Gill, the same court 
struck down DOMA as a violation of the Spending Clause, reasoning that “DOMA induces the 
Commonwealth to violate the equal protection rights of its citizens” by “impos[ing] an unconstitu-
tional condition [the denial of marriage-based benefits to same-sex couples] on the receipt of 
federal funding.” Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 
248-49 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1. 
318 See Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388-90. 
319 See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 16 (“Under current Supreme Court authority, Congress’ 
denial of federal benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts has not been 
adequately supported by any permissible federal interest.”). 
320 In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 2009). 
321 See Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1188-92 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (holding that the plaintiffs had made out cognizable equal protection and substantive due 
process claims). 
322 See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (O’Connor, J, concurring in the judgment) (“The petitioners 
are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control 
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”). 
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Clause, albeit under the rational basis standard.323 One need not extrapolate 
far from Justice O’Connor’s observation that “Texas’ sodomy law brands all 
homosexuals as criminals” and “subjects [them] to ‘a lifelong penalty and 
stigma,’”324 to conclude that sexual orientation should receive heightened 
scrutiny. If Romer was the starting point, then Lawrence, especially in 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, points toward the Court’s eventually 
agreeing with President Obama’s analysis—especially if his DOJ exerts its 
influence. 
4. Magnitude of the Ongoing Harm 
President Obama almost certainly considered the magnitude of the on-
going harm caused by DOMA. As the Solicitor General, Donald Verrilli, 
Jr., has asserted in his petition for Supreme Court review, “Authoritative 
resolution of the question presented is of great importance to the United 
States and to respondents and tens of thousands of others who are being 
denied the equal enjoyment of the benefits that federal law makes available 
to persons who are legally married under state law.”325 President Obama’s 
actions—actions that only he, as President, could take326—bespeak his 
recognition of this ongoing harm. For example, after one woman suffered a 
fatal aneurysm,327 Obama directed the Department of Health and Human 
Services to promulgate regulations requiring covered hospitals to allow 
same-sex partners to visit their partners and serve as healthcare proxies.328 
Obama also extended benefits to same-sex partners of federal employees in 
mid-2009329 and directed the Department of Labor to allow gay federal 
employees to take family and medical leave to care for same-sex partners 
and the children of those partners.330 These solutions demonstrate his grasp 
of the underlying harms DOMA creates, as well as his use of his institu-
tional competence in beginning to address them. 
 
323 Id. at 580. Justice O’Connor further explained that “moral disapproval” was not a legiti-
mate basis for discriminating against a class of individuals. Id. at 582. 
324 Id. at 581, 584 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
325 Solicitor General’s Massachusetts Certiorari Petition, supra note 132, at 13. 
326 See supra subsection III.A.2. 
327 Kevin Sack, In Hospital Decision, Obama Finds Safe Ground on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 17, 2010, at A9. 
328 The regulations cover hospitals participating in Medicare and Medicaid programs. Re-
specting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to Designate Surrogate Decision 
Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,511 (Apr. 20, 2010). 
329 Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,393 (June 22, 2009). 
330 Robert Pear, Gay Workers Will Get Time to Care for Partner’s Sick Child, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2010, at A13. 
  
2012] Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully Litigated 355 
 
In sum, in making his nondefense decision, President Obama appropriately 
evaluated (1) Congress’s actual contemporaneous rationality (what Congress 
actually reasoned at the time of enactment), (2) whether circumstances or (3) 
the law had changed, and (4) the magnitude of the ongoing harm. 
C. What Would the Court Do? President Obama  
Seeks Judicial Resolution 
Since the Court has not yet decided what level of scrutiny classifications 
based on sexual orientation should receive,331 President Obama has room to 
present his own constitutional views and seek judicial resolution as to their 
merit. The Holder Letter reads like a hybrid of a statement of policy and a 
legal brief, and for at least two courts, it has already proven to be the 
missing piece of the puzzle to its constitutional holding.332 With this 
advisory opinion, Obama has handed the courts an interpretive tool and 
asked for a constitutional fix. 
Furthermore, the DOJ has continued to seek judicial resolution of the 
issue. In its brief in Pederson v. Office of Personnel Management, the DOJ 
explained: 
 Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutionally discriminates. Section 3 treats 
same-sex couples who are legally married under their states’ laws differently 
than similarly situated opposite-sex couples, denying them the status, 
recognition, and significant federal benefits otherwise available to married 
persons. Under well-established factors set forth by the Supreme Court to 
guide the determination whether heightened scrutiny applies to a classifica-
tion that singles out a particular group, discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation merits heightened scrutiny. Under this standard of review, Section 
3 of DOMA is unconstitutional.333 
Then, applying Supreme Court precedent, the DOJ set forth a compre-
hensive argument for why classifications based on sexual orientation should 
receive heightened scrutiny.334 Noting the Romer-based arguments discussed 
earlier, the brief then applied heightened scrutiny to DOMA and argued 
 
331 See Holder Letter, supra note 2. 
332 See In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 574-76 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (adopting the Holder Let-
ter’s analysis as “sound and consistent with the legislative history of DOMA” and quoting the 
letter extensively); In re Somers, 448 B.R. 677, 682 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (refusing to apply 
DOMA as “cause” for dismissing same-sex couple’s bankruptcy case and finding the Holder Letter 
“relevant”). 
333 DOJ’s Pederson Brief, supra note 240, at 1. 
334 Id. at 8-27. 
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that the statute failed to pass muster.335 The Pederson court agreed.  
Although it decided to apply rational basis review because “the Supreme 
Court has declined to afford [homosexuals] such [suspect] status,” the court 
nonetheless concluded, after a lengthy discussion tracking the DOJ’s 
argument, that “homosexuals warrant judicial recognition as a suspect 
classification.”336 The DOJ’s approach has been consistent in other district 
courts, as well.337 
The DOJ has also advanced its position in the courts of appeals. After 
Holder sent his letter, the DOJ called it to the First Circuit’s attention in 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services.338 The DOJ 
properly asserted that it could still appeal, despite agreeing with the 
plaintiffs that DOMA is unconstitutional.339 Weeks later, the DOJ exten-
sively briefed its argument that classifications based on sexual orientation 
should receive heightened scrutiny, under which DOMA, it asserted, is 
unconstitutional.340 
Indeed, in both district court litigation and appellate review, the DOJ 
has considered its positions carefully to ensure judicial review of the equal 
protection issue at the level of heightened scrutiny. For instance, while it 
urged the First Circuit in Massachusetts to apply heightened scrutiny and 
strike down DOMA,341 it also “opposed the separate Spending Clause and 
 
335 Id. at 27-34; see also id. at 34 (“In sum, the official legislative record makes plain that 
DOMA Section 3 was motivated in substantial part by animus toward gay and lesbian individuals 
and their intimate relationships, and Congress identified no other interest that is materially 
advanced by Section 3. Section 3 of DOMA is therefore unconstitutional.”). 
336 Pederson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-1750, 2012 WL 3113883, at *16-35, *35 (D. 
Conn. July 31, 2012). 
337 See, e.g., DOJ’s Golinski Brief, supra note 240, at 3-18 (explaining why applying rational 
basis to classifications based on sexual orientation is flawed and why the court should apply 
heightened scrutiny).  
338 See Letter from Tony West, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Margaret Carter, 
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207 & 10-2214). The decision in 
Massachusetts resulted from the First Circuit’s consolidation of Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), with Gill v. Office of Personnel 
Management, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
339 See Joint Proposal Regarding Further Proceedings at 3-4, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207 & 10-2214); see also 
supra note 224. 
340 See Superseding Brief for the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
at 21-22, Massachusetts, 682 F.3d 1 (Nos. 10-2207 & 10-2214) [hereinafter DOJ’s Massachusetts Brief] 
(“Under the well-established factors set forth by the Supreme Court to guide the determination 
whether heightened scrutiny applies to a classification that singles out a particular group, 
discrimination based of sexual orientation merits heightened scrutiny. Under that standard of 
review, Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional.”). 
341 Id. 
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Tenth Amendment claims pressed by the Commonwealth” of Massachu-
setts.342 By defending on these alternative grounds, the DOJ has sent the 
unmistakable message that it wants the case decided on equal protection 
grounds. 
The DOJ has also sought to persuade courts to hold clearly and explicit-
ly that heightened scrutiny must be applied to DOMA. The risk of narrow 
holdings avoiding any ruling about the applicability of heightened scrutiny, 
and thus a prolonged period of legal uncertainty, is quite real. Not only did 
the First Circuit ultimately hold that “DOMA fails under the so-called 
rational basis test, traditionally used in cases not involving ‘suspect’ 
classifications,”343 the Ninth Circuit also rested its holding, in California’s 
same-sex marriage cases, on the narrowest possible equal protection 
grounds.344  
For this reason, the DOJ’s decision not to offer any rational basis argu-
ments at all is tactically defensible.345 For instance, in a brief in Pederson, the 
DOJ dispensed with any rational basis argument by pointing out simply 
that “[a]lthough there is substantial authority in other circuits holding that 
rational basis review generally applies to sexual orientation classifications, 
most of those decisions fail to give adequate consideration to these enumer-
ated factors [for deciding whether to apply heightened scrutiny].”346 The 
Holder Letter had stated not that the DOJ will argue the rational basis 
position, but rather that, if told by the court that “the applicable standard is 
rational basis,” the DOJ “will state that, consistent with the position it has 
taken in prior cases, a reasonable argument for Section 3’s constitutionality 
may be proffered under that permissive standard.”347 Consistent with this 
stance, the DOJ’s arguments have proceeded to note summarily and 
tangentially (e.g., in footnotes) that “if this Court holds that rational basis is 
the appropriate standard, . . . a reasonable argument for the constitutionali-
ty of Section 3 can be made under that permissive standard.”348 Even after 
the district court in Gill struck down DOMA because it “fails to pass 
constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational basis 
 
342 Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 7. 
343 Id. at 8. 
344 See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Proposition 8’s infirmity 
was just like that of Amendment 2 in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), since it targeted a 
minority group for the withdrawal of a right previously granted). 
345 See supra note 223. 
346 DOJ’s Pederson Brief, supra note 240, at 10-11 (footnote omitted). 
347 Holder Letter, supra note 2 (emphasis added); see also supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
348 DOJ’s Golinski Brief, supra note 240, at 18 n.14 (emphasis added). 
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test,”349 the DOJ refused to view DOMA at this level of scrutiny. In its 
principal brief on appeal to the First Circuit, it offered no defenses of 
DOMA under rational basis, but instead argued that the circuit’s “precedent 
applying rational basis review to classifications based on sexual orientation 
should be reconsidered.”350 Although the plaintiff had prevailed below, a 
rational basis holding was not enough for the DOJ, which argued instead 
that “the district court’s judgments should be affirmed on the ground that 
Section 3 of DOMA is subject to heightened scrutiny.”351 A lingering 
footnote still intoned that “a reasonable argument . . . can be made under” 
rational basis,352 but it has become increasingly clear that none will be found 
in the DOJ’s briefs. 
The DOJ took a step further in its brief to the Second Circuit in Wind-
sor v. United States.353 It admitted that “[n]early all other courts of appeals 
have applied rational basis review to classifications based on sexual orienta-
tion” because those courts had failed adequately to “consider the factors the 
Supreme Court has identified to guide the determination of whether 
heightened scrutiny should apply.”354 Thus, the DOJ asserted, the Second 
Circuit should “decline to adopt the reasoning of these out-of-circuit 
decisions, and instead undertake a complete analysis of the appropriate level 
of scrutiny applicable to classifications based on sexual orientation.”355 Its 
advocacy seems to have worked356: Unlike the First Circuit in Massachusetts, 
the Second Circuit agreed that “no permutation of rational basis review is 
needed,” because “heightened scrutiny is available.”357 As the DOJ had 
suggested, the court examined the “factors” that the Supreme Court uses 
“to decide whether a new classification qualifies as a quasi-suspect class,”358 
and concluded that “review of Section 3 of DOMA requires heightened 
 
349 Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010). 
350 DOJ’s Massachusetts Brief, supra note 340, at 23. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. at 46 n.20. 
353 Nos. 12-2335 & 12-2435, 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012). 
354 Brief for the United States at 33, Windsor, 2012 WL 4937310 (Nos. 12-2335 & 12-2435). 
355 Id. 
356 Indeed, it is telling that Judge Straub’s partial dissent explicitly took notice of DOJ’s 
advocacy in nondefense. See Windsor, 2012 WL 4937310, at *15 (Straub, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (“[T]he Attorney General’s current position . . . is recently minted, and is . . . 
unprecedented in its departure from the Department of Justice’s long-standing policy of 
defending federal statutes even if the President disagrees as a matter of policy.”). 
357 Windsor, 2012 WL 4937310, at *6 (majority opinion). 
358 Id.; see also id. (listing these factors as a history of discrimination, relation of the class 
characteristic to ability, discernibility of the characteristic (immutability), and political power 
(citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)). For the application of these factors to the 
President’s nondefense decision, see supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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scrutiny”359 because “homosexuals are not in a position to adequately 
protect themselves from the discriminatory wishes of the majoritarian 
public.”360 The court held that DOMA failed to meet this standard.361 
Finally, Solicitor General Verrilli has not only sought review of DOMA—
“so that the question may be authoritatively decided by th[e] Court,”362 
since the Judiciary is the final arbiter of Section 3’s constitutionality—but 
he has also done so strategically. Petitioning for certiorari in Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Verrilli notified the Court 
that, in order to “ensure that [it] will have an appropriate vehicle in which 
to resolve the issues presented in a timely and definitive fashion, the 
government is also filing [simultaneously] a petition for a writ of certiorari 
before judgment in Golinski.”363 Despite the rarity of petitioning for 
certiorari before judgment, Verrilli, in September 2012, also sought review 
of the decision of the district court in Windsor, before the Second Circuit 
ruled just over a month later, so that if neither Massachusetts nor Golinski 
“provide[d] an appropriate vehicle,” another case would be available.364 
Given the ostensible concern as this Comment goes to press that Justice 
Kagan may have to recuse herself from consideration of Massachusetts due to 
her former role as Solicitor General,365 these decisions make good tactical 
sense. After the Second Circuit’s heightened-scrutiny decision in Windsor, 
Verrilli renewed the petition with a supplemental brief asking the Court to 
take Windsor over Massachusetts or Golinski because the Court is “no 
longer . . . faced with the decision whether to grant certiorari before 
judgment.”366 And perhaps more importantly, unlike the Massachusetts 
court, the Windsor court could offer analysis more “beneficial to th[e] 
Court’s consideration,” as it was unbound by circuit precedent establishing 
“the applicable level of scrutiny.”367 
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All in all, the most important point is that President Obama and the 
DOJ have sought to influence courts’ decisions by persuading them to apply 
heightened scrutiny to their review of DOMA. Consistent with the Holder 
Letter, the Solicitor General maintains that “Section 3 of DOMA fails 
under heightened scrutiny” because it “does not substantially advance any 
important governmental purpose that motivated” its enactment.368 Further, 
Solicitor General Verrilli’s petitions for certiorari carefully explain to the 
Court why rational basis review is the incorrect standard to apply. Noting 
the moral disapproval and animosity that motivated the statute—the desire 
“not to further a proper legislative end but to make [gays] unequal to 
everyone else”369—Verrilli explained that the “First Circuit, like every other 
court of appeals that has addressed the issue to date,” had failed to provide 
“an explanation” for its conclusion that rational basis should apply to 
“classifications based on sexual orientation.”370 Indeed, he continued, 
“[s]ubsequent decisions of this Court have undermined” the reasoning of 
the appellate courts that rational basis should apply to classifications based 
on sexual orientation.371 With such advocacy, the Solicitor General, like the 
DOJ, has gone past prediction to influence. At the same time, however, the 
President’s litigators have continued to respect the separation of powers by 
consistently supporting congressional intervention in the litigation.372 
*      *      * 
As I suggest in my modifications to Dellinger’s model, Presidents deciding 
whether to defend statutes that strike them as unconstitutional under equal 
protection doctrine should consider not only descriptively what the Court 
might do, but also normatively what it should do. Indeed, Obama and the 
DOJ have sought to influence judicial decisions by persuading courts to 
apply heightened scrutiny to their review of DOMA. And a year after his 
DOMA letter, Holder sent Speaker Boehner another letter to inform 
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369 Id. at 18 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)) (internal quotation marks 
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372 In seeking Supreme Court review of DOMA, the Solicitor General explained that, alt-
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[the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, on behalf of the House of Representatives] for the purpose 
of presenting arguments in support of the constitutionality of Section 3.” Solicitor General’s 
Massachusetts Certiorari Petition, supra note 132, at 12-13 n.3. The Solicitor General reiterated that 
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Congress that the DOJ had determined that 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(3) and 101(31) 
(defining the “surviving spouse” of a veteran as only “a person of the 
opposite sex”373) are unconstitutional for the same reasons that DOMA is 
unconstitutional.374 The sum total of these actions shows President Obama’s 
recognition of the importance of not simply predicting the Court’s actions, 
but also of influencing them. Judges are wary of constitutional challenges: 
“Invalidating a federal statute is an unwelcome responsibility for federal 
judges; the elected Congress speaks for the entire nation, its judgment and 
good faith being entitled to utmost respect.”375 But when the time comes 
that that deference is misplaced, and it may continue to permit majoritarian 
tyranny, the President has a responsibility to help alert the courts that that 
deference is no longer warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1994 Dellinger framework for presidential nonenforcement of stat-
utes applies equally well—and in some respects better—to Executive 
decisions not to defend statutes that the President believes to be unconsti-
tutional. The degree of authority the President has under the Take Care 
Clause to make such decisions varies. But when the President believes that 
a statute is unconstitutional under equal protection principles, he has a 
heightened responsibility to consider alerting the Court to the statute’s 
constitutional defects, a task that he can accomplish through nondefense. 
The nondefense decision may encourage the Court to review a statute or 
government action under heightened scrutiny.  
President Obama’s decision not to defend DOMA is a paradigmatic case 
of deliberative nondefense decisionmaking. Retrospectively applying the 
modified nondefense model to Obama’s determination reveals that he 
appropriately reflected on his duty under the Take Care Clause while 
simultaneously engaging in repeal efforts. President Obama then assessed 
Congress’s actual contemporaneous rationality in passing DOMA. In 
response to the specter of animosity inherent in Congress’s rationale, and 
the clarity of changed sociopolitical circumstances, President Obama 
appropriately concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation 
should receive heightened scrutiny and that advancing this argument would 
help courts reach the same conclusion.  
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In addition, by continuing to enforce DOMA while advancing exhaus-
tive reasoning in litigation for its unconstitutionality, Obama has facilitated 
judicial resolution of the issue and respected the separation of powers. 
Implicit in Obama’s decisionmaking, and the DOJ’s following in the same 
vein, are some of the considerations not fully elaborated by the Dellinger/ 
Johnsen framework: presidential nondefense decisions depend on the nature 
of the underlying constitutional values at stake. Those decisions, and the 
authority to make them, become weightier when the underlying value is 
equal protection threatened by majoritarian tyranny. 
